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Resumo 
Esta dissertação pretende analisar as operações de titularização de ativos 
(securitization, em gíria anglo-saxónica), com especial destaque para os 
respetivos benefícios e motivações, bem como as suas principais 
desvantagens. É ainda apresentada a história e a evolução deste segmento de 
mercado financeiro, tanto nos Estados Unidos como na Europa. Analisa-se 
criticamente o impacto e implicações da crise financeira de 2007-2008 neste 
processo e as medidas económicas e financeiras implementadas pelos bancos 
centrais. 
Com base numa amostra de operações desenvolvidas nos Estados Unidos da 
América, no Reino Unido e na Europa Continental, entre 1 de janeiro de 2000 
e 31 de dezembro de 2016, no presente trabalho examina-se (1) como é que as 
características comuns determinantes do spread das  obrigações titularizadas 
se comparam entre Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e Europa Ocidental 
(EO); (2) se o spread das obrigações nos EUA são superiores aos da EO; (3) se 
o spread e os respetivos determinantes foram significativamente afetados pela 
crise financeira de 2007-2008 e, finalmente; (4) se o programa de compra de 
obrigações titularizadas implementado pelo BCE reduziu significativamente 
os spreads de crédito das obrigações emitidas nos EUA face à EO. 
Concluiu-se que o spread é efetivamente superior nos Estados Unidos do que 
nas outras áreas geográficas. Também se encontrou uma relação pouco 
significativa entre o período de crise e o aumento dos spreads, e as medidas 
do BCE foram, para algumas tipologias, bem sucedidas e de acordo com os 
seus objetivos. 
Palavras-chave: Rendimento fixo; Obrigações; Titularização de ativos 
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Abstract  
This dissertation intends to analyse the securitization process, with emphasis on 
its major benefits and motivations and its disadvantages. We present the history 
and evolution of this segment of financial markets, both in the United States 
and in Europe. We critically analyse the securitization impact on the 2007-2008 
financial crisis as well as the economic and financial consequences of the 
securitization purchase programs implemented by central banks. 
Using a sample of asset securitization (AS) bonds issued in the United States, 
United Kingdom and Continental Europe between January 1st, 2000 and 
December 31st, 2016, we examine (1) how do common pricing characteristics 
compare between AS bonds in the United States (US) vis-à-vis Western Europe 
(WE); (2) if the credit spread on AS bonds issued in the US is higher than  for 
those issued in WE; (3) if AS bond credit spreads and pricing processes were 
significantly affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis and, finally; (4) if the 
Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme reduced significantly AS bond 
credit spreads both in the US and WE. 
According to expectations, the spread is always higher for bonds issued in the 
US rather for bonds issued in Europe. We also found an insignificant 
relationship between the period of crisis and the increase in spreads, and the 
measures of the European Central Bank were, for some typologies, successful 
and in line with its objectives. 
 
Keywords: Fixed income; Bonds; Securitization  
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
INDEX 
 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. iii 
Resumo ........................................................................................................................ v 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... vii 
 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 15 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................ 18 
2.1 Securitization ................................................................................................. 18 
2.2 Types of securities ......................................................................................... 23 
2.3 History of securitization .............................................................................. 24 
2.3.1 United States .............................................................................................. 24 
2.3.2 Europe ......................................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3 US vis-à-vis Europe ................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3.1 Market characteristics ........................................................................ 25 
2.3.3.2 Government intervention ................................................................. 31 
2.3.3.3 Securitization purposes ..................................................................... 32 
2.3.3.4 Others................................................................................................... 32 
2.4 The 2007-2008 financial crisis ...................................................................... 32 
2.4.1 United States .............................................................................................. 36 
2.4.2 Europe ......................................................................................................... 37 
2.5 Determinants of credit spread ..................................................................... 38 
2.5.1 Corporate Bonds ........................................................................................ 39 
x 
 
2.5.2 Asset Securitization Bonds ....................................................................... 41 
2.6 Previous Studies ............................................................................................ 43 
3. Research Questions and Hypothesis ................................................................ 45 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................... 48 
4.1 Sample Selection and Data .......................................................................... 48 
4.2 Description of Variables ............................................................................... 49 
5. Univariate analysis .............................................................................................. 51 
5.1 Descriptive statistics ..................................................................................... 51 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics by Deal Nationality .............................................. 51 
5.1.2 Descriptive statistics by Deal Type ......................................................... 53 
5.1.3 Descriptive statistics by Deal Nationality and Deal Type ................... 55 
6. Regression analysis.............................................................................................. 60 
6.1 Regression results ......................................................................................... 60 
6.2 Robustness checks ......................................................................................... 71 
7. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 78 
References ..................................................................................................................... 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
GRAPHIC INDEX 
Graphic 1 - Historical volume of securitization issuance ...................................... 15 
 Graphic 2 -  US securitisation issuance by deal size .............................................. 26 
Graphic 3 - European securitisation issuance by deal size .................................... 27 
 Graphic 4 - US issuance by collateral ....................................................................... 28 
Graphic 5 - Europe issuance by collateral ................................................................ 29 
Graphic 6 - US issuance by rating ............................................................................. 30 
Graphic 7 - Europe issuance by rating ...................................................................... 30 
Graphic 8 - Evolution of effective federal funds rate ............................................. 34 
  
 
 
FIGURE INDEX 
Figure 1 – Standard process of securitization .......................................................... 18 
xii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
TABLE INDEX 
Table 1 - Definition of variables and expected signs .............................................. 50 
Table 2 -  Univariate statistics – Credit Spread determinants differentiated by 
United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ..................................... 52 
Table 3 - Tests of significance for the difference in values among United States, 
United Kingdom and Continental Europe............................................................... 53 
Table 4 - Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants differentiated by 
ABS, MBS and CDO .................................................................................................... 54 
Table 5 - Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants of ABS, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ...... 56 
Table 6 -  Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants of MBS, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ...... 57 
Table 7 - Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants of CDO, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ...... 58 
Table 8 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads ................... 62 
Table 9 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ...... 64 
Table 10 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of MBS, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ...... 65 
Table 11 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of CDO, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe ...... 66 
Table 12 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, 
MBS and CDO in United States with crisis and ABSPP ........................................ 68 
Table 13 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, 
MBS and CDO in United Kingdom with crisis and ABSPP .................................. 69 
xiv 
 
Table 14 -Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, 
MBS and CDO in Euro zone with crisis and ABSPP .............................................. 70 
Table 15 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, 
MBS and CDO by Type of Rate ................................................................................. 74 
Table 16 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS 
with Issuer Parent Characteristics, differentiated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe ............................................................................ 75 
Table 17 -  Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of MBS 
with Issuer Parent Characteristics, differentiated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe ............................................................................ 76 
Table 18 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of CDO 
with Issuer Parent Characteristics, differentiated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe ............................................................................ 77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Europe United States
Graphic 1 - Historical volume of securitization issuance 
1. Introduction 
According to the data information provided by the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Association of Financial 
Markets in Europe (AFME)1, in 2016, €237,6 billion of securitised product were 
issued in Europe and €1 792,9 billion in the United States (US). Therefore, we 
can a priori conclude that Europe2, when compared with the US, does not rely as 
much on this financial instrument. This fact can also be observed in Graphic 1, 
where we present the historical volume of securitization issuance in both 
economic zones3. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The values extracted from the reports stated and presented are all  denominated in 
billions of euros. The US volumes were converted from dollar to euro based on the $/€ 
exchange rates as of quarter -end.  
2 Europe includes the following countries: Finland, Lithuania, Austria, Latvia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Switzerland. 
3 Although the volume issued from Europe and the US only slightly com bine in 2008, 
as this is considered a crisis year, relying on assumptions based on this period can 
lead to a biased conclusion.  
Source: Data from SIFMA, 2010 and AFME, 2017  
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Taking in consideration these amounts and the evolution between 2000 and 
2016, a research focused on asset securitization bonds’ differences between 
the United States and Europe and, if any, provides creation of value to the 
existing literature.   
To our knowledge, no full-scale empirical study examining how credit 
spreads and pricing processes compare between Asset Securitization (AS) 
bonds issued in these two regions has already been made. Furthermore, the 
European market is, after the US market, one of the largest markets for AS 
but it has been neglected by the existing literature.  
To an accurate development of this theme, firstly, is important to determine 
if asset securitization markets and financial characteristics are different 
across these two areas and how do they are reflected in spread 
determination.  
In addition, it is also investigated how credit spreads and pricing processes 
compare not only between sub-classes of AS bonds but also between bonds 
issued in the US vis-à-vis Europe. Finally, it is also analysed the impact of the 
2007-2008 financial crisis on spreads and pricing processes as well as the 
effect of the European Central Bank asset-backed securities purchase 
program on the issuance and pricing of asset securitization bonds. 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following questions analysed: (1) 
how do common pricing characteristics compare between AS bonds in the 
United States (US) vis-à-vis Western Europe (WE); (2) if the credit spread on 
AS bonds issued in the US is higher than  for those issued in WE; (3) if AS 
bond credit spreads and pricing processes were significantly affected by the 
2007-2008 financial crisis and, finally; (4) if the Asset-Backed Securities 
Purchase Programme reduced significantly AS bond credit spreads both in 
the US and WE. 
17 
 
Based on our sample, we conclude that the spread is effectively higher in the 
US than in Europe. The crisis of 2007-2008 increased spreads and the 
program developed by the European Central Bank to mitigate this situation 
had the expected results of reducing spreads, although just for some areas 
and typologies. This study is organized as follows: in chapter 2, we present 
the literature review, to comprehend the process of securitization and its 
respective advantages and weaknesses. It is crucial to recall the history of 
this financial instrument and how it has contributed to the financial crisis. 
In chapter 3, are raised the secondary research questions that underlie our 
main question are raised, and the hypotheses to be tested. We base our 
expected results on previous studies and, subsequently, in chapter 4, we 
present the sampling procedure and define our variables that are relevant to 
our model. 
In chapter 5, we present our analysis of variables and present a preliminary 
response to our questions. The final conclusions are then presented in 
chapter 6, based on econometric analysis. 
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In this stage, the SPE initiates the process of Asset Securitization (AS). 
Assets are pooled together, characterized by different risk-return profiles, 
with their cash flows, and converted into negotiable securities8. Tranches 
may vary in terms of maturity and seniority, backed by the credit payment 
performance of securitized assets and, mostly, based on floating-rate 
coupons (Pinto et al., 2017).  
Converting these individual assets into new securities and issuing them 
into the market to investors, allows the SPV access to the capital needed to 
acquire the asset in the first place.  
Afterwards, the investor chooses the product that best suits its preferences, 
benefiting from the payment of the principal and interest on the bonds. In 
this transaction, investors classically assume the risk of cash flows of the 
pooled assets (credit risk), instead of the default risk of the originator 
(Pinto, 2017).  As the assets are no longer available to the assets’ owner, it 
provides safety and protection to the investors. 
This complex transaction is not appropriated for a typical minor financial 
intermediary, due to the required considerable capital injection, legal 
processing and due diligence.  
2.1.1 Benefits 
The first advantage related to the securitization process is the specialization 
and scope of comparative advantages. According to Thomas (1999), banks 
could decrease its funding, specializing in asset sourcing, where they 
acquired comparative advantages. 
                                                 
8 This definition is common among numerous authors, considering that this is a 
process of structured finance technique that allows credit to be provided directly 
through market mechanisms, rather than through financial intermediaries.  
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Likewise, the process of pooling assets into more homogeneous products, 
turns lending into more transparent products.  Rosenthal and Ocampo 
(1988) verified that this reduction in uncertainty, allows third parties, such 
as investors and credit agencies, to perform a more correct risk assessment 
of the underlying asset. 
Considering the direct benefits of securitization, the first that can be 
evidenced is the off-balance sheet treatment (Fabozzi and Roever, 2003; 
Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; Leblanc and Cummings, 2003). When selling 
the asset based on a true sale mechanism, the originator has the opportunity 
to release its non-performing credits from its balance-sheet, transferring 
them and the respective risk to the SPV.  This method of financing allows 
the banks to improve its return on equity  (Wolfe, 2000; Jobst, 2006; 
Martínez-Solano, et. al, 2009) and other significant financial ratios. 
The removal of non-tradable loans from the balance sheet, allows the banks 
to convert these into market securities, generating a direct source of 
liquidity (Fabozzi and Roever, 2003; Jobst, 2006; Goldberg et al., 1988; 
Martínez-Solano, et. al, 2009; Leblanc and Cummings, 2003; Loutskina, 2011; 
Clarkson and Rouyer, 2002), through the transaction of the tradable debt 
securities to the SPE. In its turn, this new availability of income permits the 
financing of new loans (Fuchita et al., 2009), thus improving liquidity 
position and promoting business growth. 
Another major motivation for the practise of this mechanism is the risk 
transference (Thomas, 1999;  Jobst, 2006; Clarkson and Rouyer, 2002). In 
other words, the banks have the opportunity to withdraw from its financial 
reports the illiquid assets, which can alter the whole risk structure of the 
bank due to the fact that these useless loans are being sold to a distinct entity 
(Martínez-Solano et. al, 2009).  
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As the banks no longer assume the risk of the underlying loans, the 
securitization process allows a major reduction of costs (Thomas, 1999; 
Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; Jobst, 2006; Davidson et. al, 2004) for most of 
its stakeholders, for instance, the originators, the investors and to the 
complete market in general (Goldberg et al., 1988).  
Firstly, this cost decrease occurs immediately in the placement of the loan in 
the market. As the banks dispends less capital to trade new securities, is 
possible to diminish the cost of lending, that, otherwise, with traditional 
debt constrains, would not be possible (Fabozzi and Roever, 2003). 
As the assets are transferred to the SPV to isolate risk, the bank will not 
continue to elaborate an extensive and detailed risk assessment, thus saving 
on administrative and bureaucratic costs. Also, pooling the assets together 
allows its transformation into a product with higher credit quality and with 
a minor cost than if they were issued individually by the originators 
(Fabozzi and Roever, 2003). 
In addition, securitization also reduces asymmetric information (Martínez-
Solano et. al, 2009) as the credit agencies continuously monitor the quality of 
the underlying assets included in the security sold by the SPV.  
Finally, allows banks to diversify their sources of income (Fabozzi and 
Roever, 2003; Jobst, 2006; Goldberg et al., 1988;  Leblanc and Cummings, 
2003; Loutskina, 2011) and eliminates the opportunity cost of the originators’ 
financial assets  (Thomas, 1999), improving asset management and 
profitability (Goldberg et al., 1988; Martínez-Solano et. al, 2009).  
In summary, the main advantages of the securitization process are the 
following: (i) Off-balance sheet treatments, (ii) Liquidity, (iii) Risk 
Transference and (iv) Cost Reduction. 
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2.1.2 Disadvantages  
There are downside effects associated to this method and these instruments, 
as testified in the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression of 1929. 
To analyse the disadvantages of this financing technique, is important to 
remember that, in the period of 2000’s, securities were backed, 
predominantly, by mortgages’ loans.  
Primary, is the creation of the SPV and the sale of the asset’s pool. It can be 
useful in guaranteeing the continuity of the originator but, on the other hand, 
due to the transference of the risk, the banks have no further incentive to 
regulate and validate the conditions under which the loan was granted, 
much less to assure that it will be fulfilled.  
Before the crisis, the lack of regulation and with the rise of liquidity 
previously mentioned, encouraged banks to increase its number of loans. The 
banks, with no incentives to control the risk to be incurred, instead of 
grouping assets into different tranches with distinct risk types, used this 
technique to set subprime and other types of loans grouped, regardless of 
their credit quality (Fuchita et al., 2009).  
By deceiving the market, investors were not aware of the true quality of the 
bonds, believing that were investing in high quality securities, however, 
these products were mispriced and reflected an overestimated price and 
quality, originating the Lemons Problem9. 
                                                 
9 If the consumers are not able to distinguish the quality of the products (good versus 
bad) in the market, they are only willing to pay a fixed price for the asset (p f).  With 
this, the owners of superior product will ask for p g  and the remaining will sell for p b.  
As the sellers recognize the quality of the product, the following assumption remains 
in the market: pg  <  p f  < pb.  So,  the good product’ sellers will have incentive to leave the 
market as they do not accept pf, remaining only the offers of the bad products. As 
consumers began to realize the true quality of the product,  the market will  eventually 
collapse (Akerlof, 1970).  
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In this work it will be explain in more detail the relation of the disadvantages 
of the securitization process and the financial crisis of 200710. 
2.2 Types of securities 
The securities issued through securitization can be classified into three major 
typologies: Asset-backed securities (ABS), Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and Collateralized debt obligations (CDO). 
ABS is a debt security collateralized by a pool of assets (other than 
mortgages), typically constituted by consumer products, such as car loans 
and credit cards (Vink and Thibeault, 2008). It provides to the issuer of the 
securities, for example banks or corporations, the possibility of transforming 
illiquid assets into immediately cash.  
According to ( Fabozzi et al., 2008), MBS are “aggregations of large numbers 
of mortgage loans with similar (but not identical) characteristics”.  This 
instrument allows banks, which are the only issuer, to have more freedom in 
lending money to the mortgages’ consumers, without being concerned 
whether the borrower will or not fulfil its obligations. 
Finally, CDO are backed by a pool of debt obligations/bonds, that can 
include approved credits of, for example, mortgages, consumables or 
personal credit. It is frequently originated in multiple countries and tend to 
be riskier than both ABS and MBS also, it is the most complex and diversified 
financial product in the way that it can also include ABS, MBS and other 
CDO (Vink and Thibeault, 2008). 
Using data provided in Structured Finance International magazine, 
published by Euromoney Institutional Investor, Vink and Thibeault (2008) 
                                                 
10 See 2.4 The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis 
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conclude that, as securitized assets are collateralized by distinct types of debt 
obligations, pricing factors should also diverge.  
In these three major classes of financial instruments, yields tend to be 
different as they are backed by distinct categories of assets. According to 
Pinto and Alves (2017), average credit spreads are higher for CDO, 
contributing to a lower interest in this product, having fewer participants 
and lowest average tranche size. 
Also, Vink and  Thibeault (2008) found that average spreads are statistically 
and significantly lower for MBS, than for ABS and CDO. This conclusion is in 
line with the previously literature (Pinto and Alves, 2017), concluding that 
CDO, due to its more diverse underlying assets, incurs in higher risks.  
2.3 History of securitization 
2.3.1 United States 
The remarkable history of securitization starts in 1970, in the US, when the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) issued for the first 
time MBS to the market. At the time, the most common security was backed 
by residential loans, as an US government encouragement programme for 
home ownership (Adams, 2005).  
Along with this institution, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae)11 was also providing this type of service and, later, the company 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) was created by the 
US Government, remaining, nowadays “the primary financing mechanism 
for all government-insured or government-guaranteed mortgage loans” 
(www.ginniemae.gov). 
                                                 
11 Fannie Mae was created in 1938, in order to correct the ch aos of the Great Depression 
of 1929. In 1968, the Housing and Urban Development divided Fannie Mae into two 
distinct institutions: Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, providing affordable access to house 
credit.   
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2.3.2 Europe 
In Europe, the first transaction occurred only in 1987, in the United Kingdom 
(UK). The firsts to join the UK, was Spain and France. Shortly, also Finland, 
Sweden, Ireland, Italy and Germany started using this different source of 
funding  (Adams, 2005).  
All these countries based its issuances on residential mortgages until 1990 
and, once the process of securitization was simplified, it allowed the increase 
of diversity of underlying assets, including car and consumer loans (Fabozzi 
and Choudhry, 2004) 
In the spread of securitization in Europe, is important to consider the 
unification of the Euro Zone in 1999 (www.ecb.europa.eu). This market 
continued to growth rapidly and, even if without incrementing the euro as a 
currency, the UK were still the principal issuer of this economic zone.  
Although considering this as a unified zone in this dissertation, the European 
countries diverge in terms of legal systems and political environment, 
leading to real differences in securitization methods and restrictions (Adams, 
2005).  
2.3.3 US vis-à-vis Europe 
Even if both regions use the same structure, the method differentiates across 
economic zones, essentially in terms of methodology and characteristics.  
2.3.3.1 Market characteristics 
In a preliminary analysis, the differences on this distinct appropriation of this 
financial instrument arises immediately from the issuance volume and 
respective deal sizes, assets used as collateral and by rating of securities 
issued.   
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As previously mentioned12, the US securitization market and its respective 
size is much larger than the European one: in 2016, €237.6 billion and €1,792.9 
billion os securities were issued in Europe and the US, respectively13. 
Considering the securitization issuance by deal size14, none of the markets is 
characterized by transactions with amounts below € 0,1 Billion, with 
exception of the year 2015.  
As seen in Graphic 3, the US has preference to issue tranches’ amounts 
between €0,1 and €1 Billion, being the most significant group, the MBS issued 
by Agencies15. In case of Europe, that is explained in Graphic 4, focus its 
number of issuances in transactions typically with major volumes (superior 
to €1 Billion). 
 Graphic 2 -  US securitisation issuance by deal size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See 1. Introduction  
13 Source: SIFMA, 2010 and AFME, 2017 
14The European data includes all asset classes –  ABS, CMBS, RMBS and euro-
denominated CDOs. US data includes ABS, non -agency CMBS and RMBS, and US 
dollar-denominated CDOs. US agency MBS, which includes agency CMBS and RMBS, is 
shown separately. All data except for CDOs is included based on the country of 
collateral 
15 These are US Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE),  such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, which create agency -MBS.  
Source: Data from AFME, 2008-2016 
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Graphic 3 - European securitisation issuance by deal size  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When this typology of operations emerged, the predominant assets used as 
collateral were residential mortgages. In most recent periods, the major 
securities issued in the US16 were still backed by house loans, yet under the 
sponsorship of by the previously mentioned governmental agencies.  
Considering alternative products with government guarantees, interest in 
non-collateralized products was expected to decline because of the lack of 
protection afforded to investors. Thus, the issuance of non-agency RMBS and 
Commercial MBS (CMBS17) were reached in 2007, consisting of €166,6 Billion 
and €399,2 Billion, respectively 
Considering ABS and CDO, the respective issuances peaked, once more, in 
2007. The financial distress brought insecurity to the market, representing a 
                                                 
16 US ABS issuance includes auto, credit card, home equity , student loan, equipment 
leases, manufactured housing, and other ; and US CDO issuance numbers only include 
US-denominated issuance regardless of the country of collateral and may include 
European transactions which are denominated in US dollars  
17 Type of mortgage-backed security that is secured by mortgages on commercial 
properties, instead of residential real estate  
Source: Data from AFME, 2008-2016 
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massive decrease on the demand for CDO, as testified in 2009, when only 
€1,6 Billion were issued. Agency MBS, as being the most trustful due to the 
governmental security, were the most used type of asset securitization in all 
periods presented. In 2016, MBS issuance achieved its maximum, 
representing an issuance of €1 460 Billion. 
Considering now the issuance by collateral, we can conclude that, according 
to Graphic 6, Residential mortgages is the collateral most used by European 
markets, being the Commercial mortgages approximately null.  
RMBS reached its maximum amount transacted in 2008, contemplating a 
value of €585,3 Billion, however, declining its performance ever since. ABS 
maintained a constant evolution, issuing, on average, €59,6 billion in the 9-
year period. 
 
 Graphic 4 - US issuance by collateral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from AFME, 2007-2016 
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Graphic 5 - Europe issuance by collateral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On Graphic 7 and 8, it is possible to analyse the American and European 
securitization market by issuance by rating. In this category, it is possible to 
conclude that, which predominates in both markets, are triple-A ratings.  
Other rates, such as AA, A or BBB & below are almost insignificant, concluding 
that this market is not homogeneous, presenting great discrepancies. 
Considering the Not Rated products, it represented, in 2007, nearly 40% of the 
total US issuance, having no influence in Europe. 
 
Source: Data from AFME, 2005-2016 
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Graphic 6 - US issuance by rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 7 - Europe issuance by rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from AFME, 2007-2016 
Source: Data from AFME, 2007-2016 
31 
 
In an overall breakdown, the US’ volume represent more than double of that 
in Europe. Nonetheless, when investigating the deal size of individual 
tranches, the European market is characterized by transactions above €1 
Billion while the US markets have lower individual amounts, ranged 
between €0,1 and €1 Billion. 
So, most US’ MBS market is operationalized by governmental agencies, being 
able to afford to the economic agents a product with a risk equivalent to a 
treasury bond. In Europe, the agents focus also on RMBS, however, without 
GSEs, investors tend to prefer a lower risk product rated as AAA.   
2.3.3.2 Government intervention 
Regarding the distinctive characteristics between the US and European 
markets, it’s possible to immediately evidence that, in Europe, there is no 
government supported agency that stimulates the securitization processes.  
These are US Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), such as Ginnie 
Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, that create agency-MBS, being 
responsible for the timely payment of the principal and interest on the bonds 
and bear the credit risk of the underlying loans, contributing to a risk of 
default practically negligible (www.invesco.com).  
These entities are responsible for guarantees, providing banks and investors 
protection and representing an incentive to the intensification of activity. 
When mortgages are issued by GSEs, it indirectly finances the mortgage 
market. Although it does not directly affect yields, mortgage rates tend to be 
lower than if they were issued by private companies (Passmore et al., 2002). 
The lack of governance warranties contributes to the great difference 
between these two major markets and, unlike Europe, the US presents a 
more unified market in terms of definitions of concepts (Adams, 2005). 
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2.3.3.3 Securitization purposes 
In the US, securitisation and the respective government’s support worked as 
an incentive strategy for consumption of real state and making it possible for 
all social ranks. 
The majority of the European countries used this financial instrument with 
the objective of reducing public budget deficits (Adams, 2005). Also, Europe’ 
securitization did not have a purpose for consumption or any specific 
purpose other than its beneficial use for banks, as a tool to expand regulation 
and diversification of capital sources. 
2.3.3.4 Others 
According to Phil Adams (2005), American consumers have more 
predisposition to acquisition of debt, resorting to this type of products more 
frequently and, consequently, a greater tendency not to fulfil its debt 
commitments. 
2.4 The 2007-2008 financial crisis 
To properly explain the 2007-2008 financial crisis, is important to understand 
the factors that lead to this event. Even if it is not possible to point only to 
one undoubted cause, this event was due to a set of factors.  
One of the most evident factors of this crisis, which tends to be devalue, was 
the cumulative deregulation on derivatives18 (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
Even if derivatives only appeared in 1990, in 1982, the US government 
started the financial deregulation of, firstly, savings and loan companies, 
allowing banks to apply individuals’ savings in uncertain investments. 
                                                 
18 These financial instruments, considered as weapons of mass destruction (by George 
Soros), are securities in which respective prices can dep end on every underlying asset 
(without exception), such as possibility of bankruptcy or raining in a certain day.   
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In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) written by the 
US government, banned the regulation of any type of derivatives, leading to 
the concentration of the power in financial markets and appropriation of 
misconduct (e.g.: commercial banks’ employees sold stock of companies with 
high probabilities of bankruptcy as if it were a prodigy investment). 
As previously mentioned, the goal of the US politics, was to provide any 
person or family the opportunity of the American dream19. To achieve this 
goal, the Federal Open Market Committee, through its mechanism to 
increase money supply in the market, lowered the federal funds rate. 
According to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the US, 
this is the interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds 
(balances held at Federal Reserve Banks) with each other overnight20.  
Based on the Effective Federal Funds Rate21, this method to increase liquidity 
was severe, throwing the rate of 6,4%, in 2000, to 1,82%, in 2001. This drop of 
4,58 percentage points exposed in the market a massive increase of accessible 
money, which, consequently, became an incentive for banks to lend. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The belief that “everyone was going to have an opportunity and the chance to live a 
life with some decency and some dignity and a chance fo r some self-respect” 
(Hochschild, 1995)   
20 When a depository institution has surplus balances in its reserve account, i t  lends to 
other banks in need of larger balances. In simpler terms, a bank with excess cash, 
which is often referred to as liquidity, w ill lend to another bank that needs to quickly 
raise liquidity (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS)  
21 Data refers to values of the closing annually rate .  
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Graphic 8 - Evolution of effective federal funds rate 
 
 
 
This incentive, along with the lack of control by the banks (provided by the 
off balance-sheet treatment of the sold assets), supported the irresponsible 
growth of the American mortgage market (Fuchita et al., 2009). 
MBS once started as a set of reliable mortgages backing the security, with 
triple-A classification by major credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard 
and Poor’s or Fitch) and backed up by the US government.  
As an individual product, this single debt type was simple and were 
evaluated as stable, providing relatively low income to the investors. 
Nonetheless, grouping a set of mortgages, improves the risk and return 
profile of the security when compared to the credit of single asset when 
originated (Fabozzi and Roever, 2003). 
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Eventually, financial intermediaries started grouping different types of risk 
class assets into securities (Fuchita et al., 2009), assuming to be “good 
substitutes” for the often safe securities (Pinto et al., 2013).  
The central problem of the situation is that, with the lack of risk analysis and 
evident access to credit, the credit quality assessment was not trustful, being 
the securities “far riskier than originally perceived by investors and certified 
by rating agencies” (Pinto et al., 2013). 
At this point, it is important to refer that, even if the bank ensuring credit to 
any individual, credit rating agencies should intervene in the market by 
assigning appropriated ratings.  
Still, as the “credit rating agencies were paid by the originators of the assets 
to evaluate the underlying credit quality of the financial products being 
created” (Fuchita et al., 2009), these agencies had the possibility and 
motivating to delight its customers, whom, in return, took the advantage of 
being able to choose who best qualified their products. 
According to Fuchita et al. (2009), the market only recognised this market 
failure when the housing prices eventually began to decline, due to the 
oversupply of houses and the excessive leverage which characterized the 
market. The bonds became worthless, due to the lack of periodic repayments 
to its issuers and investors.  
On 15th of September of 2008, when the investment bank Lehman Brothers 
declared bankruptcy, representing the largest insolvency in history. This 
event led to financial difficulties for banks, which, in turn, made it difficult 
for companies (and consumers) to access credit, triggering a sharp increase in 
unemployment in the Euro Area22, as in the United States23. 
                                                 
22 Available at https://www.bportugal.pt/page/estatisticas -da-area-do-euro?mlid=2348  
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Even if the crisis unrolled in the US, it was accountable for global economic 
and financial impacts, leading to the impacts and consequences of the 
collapse of the mortgage market in Europe. 
The responses of central banks differed between the United Stated and 
Europe, considering that the underlying assets and securitization processes 
and characteristics are also distinct (Fuchita et al., 2009). 
2.4.1 United States  
Considering the abrupt end of the credit boom, central banks24  were 
responsible for the implementation of monetary policies25, maintaining 
employment and price stability, to recover and preserve conditions in 
financial markets (www.federalreserve.gov).  
The Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, implemented 
three distinct groups of tools: (i) provision of short-term liquidity to banks 
and financial institutions; (ii) provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and 
investors; and (iii) supported new market operations.  
With these measures, the government sought to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis on the normal functioning of markets, setting a downward pressure on 
longer-term interest rates and easing overall financial conditions 
(www.federalreserve.gov). 
These measures agree with the market and economic agents’ outlook, 
considering that the consequences were being interpreted primarily as a 
short-term liquidity problem (Fuchita et al., 2009).  
                                                                                                                                          
23 Available at https://www.abi.org/newsroom/chart -of-the-day/number-of-
unemployed-for-over-26-weeks-since-1969-2  
24 Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) in the US and European Central Bank (ECB) in Europe  
25 Monetary policy operates by steering short -term interest rates, thereby influencing 
economic developments, in order to maintain price stabil ity for the euro area over the 
medium term (www.ecb.europa.eu)  
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2.4.2 Europe 
In Europe, the global financial crisis, due to globalization, reached the 
markets on the day of the Lehman collapse. European markets also suffered 
from a sovereign crisis on May of 2010, due to the bailout countries.   
Soon after the announcement of September 2008, in order to reduce the 
“tensions in the euro money market”, the ECB (European Central Banks) 
implemented liquidity improvement measures, reduced interest rates to 
“historical low levels” and monitoring the European money market 
conditions (www.ecb.europa.eu).  
The objective of ECB was to promote its long-term principles, such as: (i) 
price stability, (ii) control of financial markets and (iii) minimization of 
general losses. According to (Rajendra and Pratt, 2008), the extraordinary 
European policy, based on the extension of deposit guarantees, aimed the 
continuity of the banking system as a provider of sources of funding.  
On May of 2009, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
launched the first Purchase programme for euro-denominated covered 
bonds (CBPP1).  According to the ECB, the aim of the programme was to (i) 
contribute to easing funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises 
and to (ii) encouraging credit institutions to maintain and expand their 
lending to customers, simulating activity in this market section 
(www.ecb.europa.eu). 
The first impact felt in the market was caused by the wave of confidence that 
this surprise announcement brings to the market, leading to a recovery of the 
primary market and a tightening of spreads in the secondary market (Beirne 
et al., 2011). 
At the same time (end of 2009), the first events that developed the European 
sovereign crisis began to show off signs in the market. First, the collapse of 
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the Icelandic banking system, also severely affecting Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain and Italy.   
The announcement of these countries that were not in the financial 
conditions to repay the governmental debt, eventually defeated the slight 
security prevailing in European financial markets. 
In a snowball effect, a large government debt that was present in many 
European countries reality, followed by the bankruptcy of large financial 
institutions, developed a crisis of mistrust in the European market. 
On October of 2011, ECB launched the second purchase programme, CBPP2, 
prevailing the objectives implemented in CBPP1. 
The Asset-Backed Security Purchase Programme (ABSPP) was implemented 
on November of 2014, with the objective of providing banks with the 
necessary diversified funds, helping in the availability of credit, stimulating 
the real economy.  
According to the study realized by the ECB, these two measures represented, 
in overall, a spread tightening for covered bonds, being testified in the 
differences of spreads between eligible and non-eligible ABS. 
Other banks also intervened in the market in a globally scale, such as the 
Bank of England and the Bank of Japan. Overall, there was a set of fund 
injection realized by central banks: €100 Billion from the ECB 
(www.ecb.europa.eu) and “smaller amounts of $5 Billion from the Bank of 
Japan and $2 Billion from the Federal Reserve” (Fuchita et al., 2009). 
2.5  Determinants of credit spread 
As the main objective of this work is to compare spreads and pricing 
processes of asset securitization bonds in the U.S. vis-à-vis Europe, next we 
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discuss the existing literature on this subject not only for securitization but 
also for corporate bonds. 
2.5.1 Corporate Bonds 
Considering corporate bonds, Chen et al. (2007) present liquidity as a “key 
determinant in yield spreads”. Based in more than 4 000 corporate bonds 
over a 9-years period, the authors found that liquidity explains more than 
50% of the cross-sectional variation in yield spread level, being this result 
more influential than the credit ratings. These authors found that, yield 
spreads reduce as an improvement in liquidity occurs, and determined that 
more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads. 
Using transactions between 2003 and 2009, Bao et al. (2011) confirm that 
illiquidity is an important variable in the determination of spreads, 
determined a positive relation between this two factors. Illiquidity is 
especially vital in this dissertation, due to the consequences of occurrences in 
the summer of 2007. 
Opting for a simple model based on “a quarterly sample of 394 US 
corporations’ credit premia for the period 1986–1998”, Flannery et al. (2012) 
conclude that Capital Structure influences credit spreads, mainly based on 
the impact of investors’ expectations about future leverage of firms. Even if 
this relation could be either positive or negative, the results indicate a robust 
positive correlation.  
Furthermore, using a different perspective by means of leverage ratios, 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) develop a model where firms adjust 
their ratios to reflect variations in asset value. The results are in accordance 
with those presented in the previous mentioned paper, indicating that 
market prices would reflect the variations on these ratios.  
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In an attempt of determining the broad factors that affect corporate bond 
pricing, Gabbi and Sironi (2005) based their investigation on spreads of 
Eurobonds issued by major prestigious companies between 1991 and 2001. 
The research has proven the increasing support and accreditation, by 
investors, in rating companies and their judgements. In this way, Credit 
Rating enters as a variable that emerges in bonds’ prices, presenting a pattern 
of growth in spreads when credit rating becomes worse. 
Longstaff et al. (2005) use data of credit default swaps within a 5-years 
prospect, “to provide evidence about the size of the default and non-default 
components in corporate spreads”. By using credit default swap premia to 
measure this component, the authors determine that Default Risk influences 
significantly corporate bond spreads.  
Whether if the security ranks below other securities regarding claims on 
assets or earnings (junior security) has a positive but not significant impact 
on spreads of CB, even after controlling for bond ratings, according to Gabbi 
and  Sironi (2007). 
The variables that stand out the most when it comes to corporate bonds are: 
(i) Liquidity, (ii) Leverage ratios, (iii) Credit Rating. Even so, this authors 
similarly underlined the succeeding: (iv) Bond volatility (Chen et al., 2007), 
(v) Debt Maturity, (vi) Credit Risk and  (vii) Information Asymmetry 
(Daniels et al., 2010), (viii) Interest Rate (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 
2001), (ix) Equity volatility (Campbell and Taksler, 2003), (x) Governmental 
issuance (Elton et al.,  2001), (xi) Intermediation process (Carey and Nini, 
2007), (xii) transaction size, (xiii) tranche to transaction, (xiv) maturity, (xv) 
risk free rate and (xvi) volatility (Pinto et al., 2017). 
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2.5.2 Asset Securitization Bonds 
Taking into account the existing literature regarding the pricing process of 
asset securitization bonds, the major factors that influence spreads are (i) 
default risk, (ii) transaction size, (iii) year of issuance ( Pinto et al., 2015) 
(Vink and Thibeault, 2008) (Moody’s, 2005), (iv) recovery risk, (v) number of 
tranches, (vi) number of underwriters, (vii) number of credit rating agencies, 
(viii) whether or not the issue is retained, (ix) type of interest rate, (x) 
tranching, (xi) maturity, (xii) currency of the loan (Vink and  Thibeault, 2008), 
(xiii) management fees and (xiv) collateral type (Pinto et al., 2017). 
Firstly, considering the default and recovery risk variables, such as time to 
maturity, credit rating and country risk, we can conclude that, through the 
analysis of the following authors, Pinto et al. (2015), Vink and Thibeault 
(2008) and Hu and  Cantor (2005), the impact of the variable Maturity differs 
across investigations.  
Pinto et. al, (2015) concluded that, in general, maturity has an insignificant 
impact on credit spreads, due to the match of maturities between the 
securities issued and the assets used as collateral. Nonetheless, for Vink and 
Thibeault (2008), it differs among type of security. For ABS the authors 
proved that there is a positive relationship of maturity with spread and a 
negative correlation for MBS and CDOs. 
If there is a credit rating agency involved, is assumed that the bond is rated, 
we can appropriate the results of Vink and Thibeault (2008) on the number of 
credit rating agencies on the impact of a Rated Security has on its spreads. In 
this way, we conclude that, if security is rated, it implies less risk, being for 
CDOs a significant and negative relation. On the other hand, it is 
insignificant for ABS and MBS. 
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Also based on Vink and Thibeault (2008) investigation, there was a present 
pattern of increase on spreads as the credit rating deteriorated. And, for 
Country Risk, Pinto et al. (2015) found that the coefficients are insignificant 
for AS transactions, due to the intrinsic characteristics of the transactions. 
Considering factors related more directly to the characteristics of the 
securities, namely marketability variables, for instance: transaction size, 
number of tranches, number of banks and fixed or floating rate issue, the 
results are, once again, distinct results differ between types of securitization.  
According to Pinto et al. (2015), there is a negative and statistical significance 
of transaction size and tranche to transaction ratio with the evolution of 
spreads on AS.  
For Vink and Thibeault (2008), the results on transaction size are also 
significant and negative for ABS and MBS and a relation insignificant and 
positive for CDOs, justified as an “evidence of a positive price liquidity effect 
related to the size of the entire issue”. 
The number of financial intermediaries participating in the issuance only 
appears to have a negative and significant impact for MBS, being 
insignificant for ABS. For CDOs, the results have proven to be insignificant 
and positive, probably due to difference in evaluation criteria by investors 
and capital markets (Vink and  Thibeault, 2008). 
The same authors also evidence a strong positive relation for ABS and MBS, 
between the issues that are fixed priced and the credit spreads, easily 
explained by the protection of non-fluctuating rates. 
The variable Currency Risk associated as a systematic risk variable, has a 
positive and significant relationship with all asset securitization categories. 
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According to Pinto et al. (2015), there is no significant relation between 
whether AS bond has a call option or not. However, when considering 
Corporate Bonds (CB), the authors found a strong positive relationship with 
credit spreads. 
Using the findings of Pinto et al. (2015), on general AS bonds, the risk free 
rate has an insignificant relationship with the determination of spreads. Also, 
market volatility has a significant and positive impact on spreads of loans 
and bonds. 
The five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor rate, namely the slope of 
the Euro swap curve (Hu and  Cantor, 2006) is significantly and negatively 
related to credit spread (Pinto et al., 2015). 
Esty and Megginson (2002) assumed that common law systems provided 
stronger creditor rights, being these two variables related in the same level to 
the determination of credit spreads. 
As far as macroeconomic impacts are concerned, based on Criado and  Rixtel 
(2008) and Pinto et al. (2017), the 2007 crisis enlarged spreads and that, based 
on Watfe (2015), the European Central Bank’s asset purchase programs 
generally lower sovereign bond spreads. 
2.6 Previous Studies 
As previously referred, there is no study examining how credit spreads and 
pricing processes compare between Asset Securitization (AS) bonds issued 
between these two regions. However, Carey and Nini (2007) offered evidence 
that interest rates on syndicated loans are indeed different among the United 
States and Europe, “with interest rate spreads smaller in Europe by about 30 
basis points (bps) on average”. 
44 
 
Also, the data proved that there is home bias in the securitized market, 
considering the United States, Europe and Asia as the major markets. When 
borrowers issue outside its residential market, the tendency is to issue in 
Europe. The authors believe that this fact is due to historical data and 
because Europe tends to be a cheaper market. 
The final conclusions were that asymmetric information, regulation, portfolio 
diversification effects, even against the expected results, does not perform 
differently across the location of the agents. When considering firm size and 
borrower financial characteristics, “the price difference across markets 
remains statistically and economically significant”. 
What we intend with this work is to see if, as for the syndicated loan market 
studied by these authors, the securitization operations in the US and Europe 
have similar credit spreads and if the pricing process is similar or not. 
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3. Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Based on the literature review we can expect that (i) asset securitization 
bonds’ characteristics differ significantly per typology (ABS versus MBS 
versus CDO); (ii) differ significantly per geographic zone (US versus UK 
versus CE); (iii) the 2007-2008 financial crisis impacts significantly the 
spreads; and (iv) the ECB’ ABS purchase programme impacts spreads, 
namely in the Euro Area. 
Analysing the market data for the US versus Europe, is apparent that these 
markets are distinct in economic and financial matters, mainly derived from 
macroeconomic and policy differences, such as the governmental 
intervention on the market, motivations for the use of securitization and 
preferences of economic agents (Adams, 2005). 
So far there is no full-scale study examining how credit spreads and pricing 
processes compare between the U.S. and Europe. We try to fill this gap in 
literature. Thus, we raise the following research questions and hypotheses: 
(1)  How do common pricing characteristics compare between AS bonds in 
the United States vis-à-vis Western Europe (WE)? 
Hypothesis 1: Credit spreads and princing characteristics differ significantly 
between AS bonds issued in the US versus WE. 
Carey and Nini (2007) show that the credit spread is higher for syndicated 
loans issued in the US vis-à-vis in Europe. We thus raise a second question:  
(2) Is the credit spread on AS bonds in the US higher than the credit 
spread on AS bonds in WE? 
Hypothesis 2: AS bonds credit spread is higher in the US than in WE. 
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It has been shown that the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis had an irreversible impact on the global 
economy, leading to abruptly increase of bond credit spreads (Criado and 
Rixtel, 2008; Gorton and Metrick, 201226; Caprio et al.,2010). 
In this way, it is imperative to include an investigation to perceive the impact 
of these events, focusing on whether the 2007-2008 financial and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis affected significantly AS bond 
credit spreads and pricing determinants. We thus raise a third question: 
(3) Are the credit spread and pricing processes of AS bonds significantly 
affected by the 2007-2008 financial? 
Hypothesis 3:   The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis affected significantly AS bonds credit spread and pricing 
determinants. 
To mitigate the impacts and consequences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
central banks were forced to intervene in the financial markets. As the 
processes and characteristics of securitization are distinct, their measures 
would also have to be appropriate to their products and, therefore, the 
results will be diverse (Fuchita et al., 2009). 
In our fourth question, we seek to understand which the real impact of these 
measures on credit spreads was, testing whether if this impact reverberated 
into a significant reduction in credit spreads. 
(4) What was the impact of the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase 
Programme on AS bond credit spreads? 
Hypothesis 4:  Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme reduced significantly 
AS bond credit spreads both in the US e and WE. 
                                                 
26 Specifically related to ABS 
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The study carried out by the European Central Bank27 on the impact of CBPP 
and ABSPP in the economy, based on European data, concluded that its 
measures fulfilled the general intervention objective: a spread tightening for 
covered bonds, as desired, in which are going to ground the expectations on 
these data. 
Also, Claessens et al. (2010) evidenced that the overall measures fulfilled the 
general intervention objective, both in a matter of market stabilization and 
confidence.  
In conclusion, it is important to note that this analysis will seek to answer all 
these questions, either positively or negatively, and that this analysis will 
also be performed considering the three different asset securitization bonds’ 
issuances; i.e., ABS, MBS and CDO. 
 
  
                                                 
27 Available at www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/bmcg/150127/2015-01-27-Item-3-
2.pdf?01c15557a8aa45e3164e28ccd2760b74 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1  Sample Selection and Data 
For a complete, consistent and value-added investigation, it is important that 
the sample on which we base the conclusions is adequate and reliable. In this 
way, the extraction of our database from DCM Analytics, which is a 
competitive benchmarking system covering the Global Debt Capital Markets28, must 
be adequate.  
To determine our sample, it is first important to extract the complete data. 
This included detailed information regarding bond securities issued, such as 
ABS, MBS and CDO, between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2016. 
As the extracted data included several types of assets as collateral, codes 
were assigned by typology of security, for an easier evaluation, namely: (1) 
asset-backed securities, (2) Mortgage-backed securities and (3) Collateralized 
debt obligations.  
In the first extraction performed, our database included ninety-seven 
thousand records of extracted issuances. Then, we performed the following 
screens: (i) remove perpetual and to be announced (TBA) types of maturities; 
(ii) remove synthetic CDOs; (iii) considering de variable rate, only the 
following indices were included: Euribor, Libor and USD Libor; and (iv) we 
decided to withdraw the outliers referring to Credit Spread and Transaction 
Size, truncating the date in the 1% and 99% percentile. 
In this chapter, it is important to note that since both (1) United States and (2) 
United Kingdom have a market-based financial system, we decided to 
separate Western Europe into two sub-regions: United Kingdom and (3) 
                                                 
28 Available at 
http://www.biblioteca.porto.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/files/Biblioteca/GD_UserGuide.pdf 
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Continental Europe. The latter, developed around a bank-based financial 
system, does not resemble US as UK does. 
After applying all these procedures, our sample consists of 91,459 bonds, 
worth 87,514 USD billion. In detail, we have 47,150 ABS bonds (52%), 27,671 
MBS bonds (30%) and 16,638 CDO bonds (18%) corresponding, respectively, 
to the value of 42,314 USD billion, 26,555 USD billion and 9,610 USD billion. 
4.2 Description of Variables 
We use, in our econometric analyses, credit spread, in basis points, as the 
dependent variable. 
For an easier description and interpretation of the independent variables, we 
present table 1, with the description of the variable, the expected results and 
the literature review on which we base these signs.  
We decided to present this summarised literature review, even if our 
objective is not to conclude about the impact of variables, but rather to 
determine whether there is a gap between credit spreads between the United 
States and Europe. 
The characters on this table have the subsequent meaning: + | positive 
impact on credit spread; -| Negative impact on the credit spread; i| 
Insignificant impact on the credit spread; ? |Sign cannot be clearly 
determined from the existing literature. 
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Dependent Variable: ABS MBS CDO
Time to maturity
Transaction size
Tranche to transaction
Number of banks
Callable
Rated
Credit Rating
Fixed Rate 
Country Risk
Currency Risk
Risk Free
Volatility
Euso5y-Libor3m
Subordinated Debt
GDP per capita
Common Law
Creditor Rights
Crisis
ABSPP
Spread at issue over comparable risk-free government 
security with a comparable maturity
+ i + i + i
- - -
+ + +
? ? ?
i i i
- + +
+ +
+ + - i
- - -
+ i - - i
- i - + i
- - + i
+ - -
+ +
- i - i - i
(Esty & Megginson, 2002)
(Esty & Megginson, 2002) -
- -
- i - i
+ i + i
(Criado and Rixtel, 2008); (Pinto et al., 
2017); (Gorton and Metrick, 2012); 
(Caprio et al.,2010).
(Watfe, 2015); (Claessens et al., 2010) 
+
(Pinto et al., 2013)
(Vink & Thibeault, 2008); (Pinto et al., 
2015)	
	
(Pinto et al., 2017)
(Pinto et al., 2017)
(Hu & Cantor, 2006)
(Gabbi & Sironi, 2007)
- i
+ i
(Goswami et al., 2009)
+
Variable Description Expected ResultsEmpirical Literature
Dummy equal to 1 if the security was issued in the crisis 
period (September 16, 2000 to December 31, 2016), 1 
otherwise
Dummy equal to 1 if the security were issued in the ECB'  
ABS purchase programme period (September 4, 2014 to 
December 31, 2016), 0 otherwise
(Pinto et al., 2015); (Vink and 
Thibeault, 2008); (Hu & Cantor, 2005)
Security that ranks below other securities with regard to 
claims on assets or earnings (junior security)
Measure of the total output of a country that takes the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and divides it by the number 
of people in that country
Common law dummy takes the value 1 for common-law 
countries and the value 0 for others
- -
-
Creditor rights are measured using La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) and Spamann’s (2010) 
indices
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond is rated, 0 otherwise
Bonds rating at the time of issuance, based n Standard & 
Poor's Rating Scale: (1) AAA, (2) AA+, (3) AA,…, (22) D
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond is fixed priced, 0 otherwise
S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is converted 
as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until D=22
Dummy equal to 1 for securities that are denominated in a 
currency different from the currency in the deal's 
nationality, 0 otherwise
The yield on a United States Treasury Bond for the United 
States and the yield on a German Treasury bill for Europe, 
at the time of issuing the bonds
Natural Log of the maturity (in years) of the security
Natural Log of the of the transaction size (in USD million)
Credit Spread (bps) 
Independent Variables:
Ration of tranche size to the transaction size (%)
Number of financial intermediaries participants in the bond 
issuance
Dummy equal to 1 if the security has call option, 0 
otherwise
(Pinto et al., 2015); (Vink and 
Thibeault, 2008; (Hu & Cantor, 2005)
(Pinto et al., 2015); (Vink and 
Thibeault, 2008); (Hu & Cantor, 2005)
(Vink & Thibeault, 2008); (Pinto et al., 
2015)	
	
(Pinto et al., 2015)
(Vink & Thibeault, 2008)
(Vink & Thibeault, 2008)
(Vink & Thibeault, 2008)
The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). 
VIX reflects
a market estimate of future volatility
Difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-
month Libor rate, namely the slope of the Euro swap curve 
(a proxy of the expectations about the future evolution of 
interest rates)
Table 1 - Definition of variables and expected signs 
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5. Univariate analysis 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
To perform a statistical analysis, we start by comparing bond pricing 
characteristics per regions (Table 1 - US, UK and Continental Europe); 
secondly, we compare characteristics by security type (Table 3 - ABS, MBS 
and CDO); and, finally, we perform a more complete and crossed-data 
analysis of this information, comparing security type per region (Table 4, 
Table 5 and Table 6).  
We also present t-tests and Fisher's exact tests (Table 2) comparing the values 
of each variable of interest, intersecting information, namely US versus UK, 
UK versus Continental Europe and US versus Continental Europe. 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics by Deal Nationality 
With the results across economic zones and the significance tests presented 
on Tables 2 and 3, it is proven that, in a first analysis, the spreads are 
economically and statistically higher in US (91,70), than they are in UK 
(67,69) and CE (-9,06).  
Following this information, another important variable to mention is the 
Credit Rating, which is also economically and statistically lower for the US 
(3,63), than they are for the UK (4,33) and CE (4,68), suggesting that the 
bonds average rating is lower in CE vis-à-vis the US and UK. 
This result goes according to the statistical significance of the Country Risk 
variable, which is, in its turn, higher for the CE (1,76) than for the UK (1,35) 
and the US (1,09). In this way, it might seem logical that the number of 
financial intermediaries participating in this process would be superior in 
CE. Despite that, this variable is not economically and statistically significant, 
presenting the same value for all geographical areas. 
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US UK CE US UK CE
53 466 5 105 7 863 53 156 5 066 7 834
91,70 67,69 -9,06 1,09 1,35 1,76
453,70 187,64 255,53 0,66 1,29 1,84
67,40 62,44 -30,40 1,00 1,00 1,00
-662,30 -536,50 -581,90 0,00 0,00 0,00
63 744,22 2 004,50 2 864,20 10,00 11,00 20,00
53 457 5 105 7 858 51 153 4 675 6 905
25,71 28,21 26,74 3,63 4,33 4,68
10,37 15,27 19,40 3,42 3,75 4,15
29,99 31,91 23,45 1,00 3,00 3,00
0,03 0,92 0,99 0,00 0,00 0,00
91,00 99,00 94,08 21,00 21,00 21,00
53 466 5 105 7 858 53 466 5 105 7 863
835,05 2 792,35 1 276,20 9,28 8,07 4,81
668,07 4 398,28 2 183,29 6,76 4,90 2,57
683,92 1 019,75 720,84 8,00 7,00 4,00
0,25 2,64 0,09 1,00 1,00 1,00
20 467,76 33 365,34 37 897,90 59,00 26,00 18,00
53 466 5 105 7 863 53 466 5 105 7 863
197,79 336,53 340,15 0,02 0,02 0,02
414,01 850,53 1 155,54 0,25 0,29 0,35
45,00 75,00 59,01 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,74 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
20 467,76 25 292,00 30 476,32 7,00 6,00 11,00
53 466 5 105 7 863
0,28 0,20 0,30
0,37 0,26 0,35
0,07 0,08 1,00
0,00 0,00 0,00
1,00 1,00 1,00
53 466 5 105 7 863 53 466 5 105 7 863
36 043 2 716 4 026 51 107 4 672 6 892
0,67 0,53 0,51 0,96 0,92 0,88
53 466 5 105 7 863 53 466 5 105 7 863
18 531 424 738 574 2 430 367
0,35 0,08 0,09 0,01 0,48 0,05
Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with data available
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
% of data available % of data available
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
% of data available % of data available
Fixed Rate Currency Risk 
Maximum
Univariate Analysis - dummy variables
Callable Rated 
Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with data available
Minimum
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Tranche to transaction (%) 
Number of observations
Mean
Standard Deviation
Median
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Tranche size (USD million) Number of banks 
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median Median
Maximum Maximum
Transaction size (USD million) Number of tranches 
Number of observations Number of observations
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Time to Maturity (years) Credit Rating 
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Credit Spread (bps) Country Risk 
Univariate Analysis - continuous variables
Variable of interest DEAL NATIONALITY Variable of interest DEAL NATIONALITY
In terms of dummy variables, only two situations are relevant: in the US, a 
much higher rate of issues is fixed priced (35% versus UK 8% and CE 9%) 
and, on the other hand, UK have a higher proportion of issuances (48% 
versus 1% for US and 5% for CE) of securities that are denominated in a 
currency different from GBP (British Pound Sterling). 
Table 2 -  Univariate statistics – Credit Spread determinants differentiated by United States, 
United Kingdom and Continental Europe 
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UK versus Continental 
Europe
US versus Continental 
Europe
Credit Spread (bps) 7,32 * 19,68 * 28,90 *
Time to Maturity (years) -15,00 * 7,33 * -6,29 *
Transaction Size (USD millions) -40,80 * 25,69 * -12,57 *
Tranche Size (USD millions) -21,34 * 7,75 * -12,92 *
Tranche to Transaction (%) 26,31 * -19,07 * -0,05
Country Risk -13,91 * -16,62 * -33,58 *
Credit Rating -12,26 * -5,56 * -20,88 *
Number of Tranches 6,52 * 45,01 * 97,66 *
Number of Banks -1,15 -0,26 -1,42
Callable (0/1) 0,000 # 0,199 0,000 #
Rated (0/1) 0,893 0,000 # 0,000 #
Fixed Rate (0/1) 0,000 # 0,002 # 0,000 #
Currency Risk (0/1) 0,000 # 0,000 # 0,000 #
Dummy variables: Fisher's exact test (p-values)
Geographic Zone
Continuous variables: two-sample t -tests assuming unequal variances
US versus UK
Variable of interest 
Table 3 - Tests of significance for the difference in values among United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe 
 
5.1.2 Descriptive statistics by Deal Type 
Table 4 presents our univariate results comparing the three different bond 
types. We can conclude what was previously evidenced29: the Credit Spread 
is higher for CDOs (157,78), following ABS (84,69) and MBS (19,96). In this 
way, it is possible to validate that CDOs include more risk, due to its 
diversity of assets used as collateral. The same can be concluded based on the 
highest value of Credit Rating. 
A typical MBS issuance presents a highest maturity (30 years), when 
compared to ABS (25 years) and CDO (22 years). The same logic also applies 
when considering the transaction size, presenting, respectively, USD 1 495 
million, USD 930 million and 587 million USD. 
                                                 
29 By Vink and  Thibeault  (2008) and Pinto and Alves (2017) 
For continuous variables,  * indicate significant difference at the 5% level, respectively,  
between the two respective zones. For dummy variables, # indicates that the proportion 
of tranches for which dummy = 1 differ significantly between the two zones.  
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ABS MBS CDO ABS MBS CDO
36 205 19 292 10 937 35 882 19 238 10 936
84,69 19,96 157,78 1,20 1,17 1,19
199,92 161,63 940,89 1,06 0,83 0,85
63,22 32,30 98,62 1,00 1,00 1,00
-658,70 -1 136,60 -654,90 0,00 0,00 0,00
13 367,00 6 336,50 63 744,22 20,00 20,00 10,00
36 192 19 291 10 937 34 659 17 926 10 148
24,63 30,74 22,31 3,99 2,62 5,20
10,60 11,90 15,05 3,41 3,14 4,02
29,99 30,07 13,09 3,00 1,00 4,00
0,06 0,08 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
61,24 94,08 99,00 21,00 21,00 20,00
36 205 19 287 10 937 36 205 19 292 10 937
930,18 1 494,95 586,97 10,71 5,65 7,19
726,82 2 772,73 630,03 6,01 7,29 2,59
789,00 770,00 455,74 11,00 3,00 7,00
0,25 0,09 1,19 1,00 1,00 1,00
9 689,34 37 897,90 20 001,70 42,00 59,00 22,00
36 205 19 292 10 937 36 205 19 292 10 937
126,51 484,87 94,48 0,03 0,02 0,00
249,33 977,78 306,50 0,30 0,27 0,10
34,64 227,39 30,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
6 534,27 64 698,19 16 601,70 7,00 11,00 7,00
36 205 19 292 10 937
0,17 0,52 0,17
0,26 0,45 0,24
0,05 0,44 0,06
0,00 0,00 0,00
1,00 1,00 1,00
36 205 19 292 10 937 36 205 19 292 10 937
29 272 10 732 2 781 34 635 17 919 10 117
0,81 0,56 0,25 0,96 0,93 0,93
36 205 19 292 10 937 36 205 19 292 10 937
9 729 8 851 1 113 444 1 445 1 482
0,27 0,46 0,10 0,01 0,07 0,14
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
% of data available % of data available
Fixed Rate Currency Risk 
Nº of issues with data available
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
Nº of issues with data available
% of data available % of data available
Median
Maximum
Callable Rated 
Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with data available
Mean Mean
Univariate Analysis - dummy variables
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Minimum
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Tranche to transaction (%) 
Number of observations
Mean
Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Tranche size (USD million) Number of banks 
Number of observations Number of observations
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Transaction size (USD million) Number of tranches 
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Time to Maturity (years) Credit Rating 
Minimum Minimum
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median
TYPE OF SECURITY
Univariate Analysis - continuous variables
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Credit Spread (bps) Country Risk 
Variable of interest TYPE OF SECURITY Variable of interest 
Median
Table 4 - Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants differentiated by ABS, MBS and CDO 
In this case, we observe that most of the sample is rated (US 96%, UK 93% 
and CE 93%) and that only a small percentage is exposed to currency risk 
(1% for the US, 7% for UK and 14% for CE). 
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5.1.3 Descriptive statistics by Deal Nationality and Deal Type 
The following tables present a more particular analysis, in which we cross 
the type of security by indicated geographical area. 
Analysing ABS, based on table 5, we realize that the Credit Spread is higher 
in the US (90,75) than in UK (81,29) and CE (5,61).  
Concerning Time to Maturity, the difference is evident when we compare the 
three economic regions: 25 years for bonds issued in the US versus 15 years 
for bonds issued in UK 16 years for bonds issued in CE. 
Again, in terms of currency risk, it is only relevant to the UK, considering 
that 27% of the data available are securities that are denominated in a 
currency different from GBP (British Pound Sterling). 
Based on the characteristics of the MBS, as presented in table 6, we can 
conclude that the average Credit Spread is higher for bonds issued in UK 
(50,11 bps), followed by US (32,14 bps) and EC (-49,98 bps). 
Regarding the variable time to maturity, we show that it is higher in CE (37 
years) compared to UK (33 years) and the US (28 years). Is is also important 
to highlight that the number of fixed-rated MBS in the US (70%) is much 
higher than those for EC and UK, with 4% and 3%, respectively. 
Regarding CDOs, Table 7 shows that the credit spread, on average, is more 
similar between US (191,19 bps) and UK (119,84 bps), and higher than that 
for EC (56,53 bps). They also present the highest credit rating, proving that 
they are, effectively, and across regions, the most complex product, involving 
more risk. 
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US UK CE US UK CE
33 048 653 2 504 32 740 653 2 489
90,75 81,29 5,61 1,11 1,68 2,20
183,12 193,85 344,72 0,76 2,10 2,48
66,71 64,55 -18,54 1,00 1,00 1,00
-658,70 -347,39 -576,80 1,00 0,00 0,00
4 364,96 1 652,00 2 731,60 10,00 10,00 20,00
33 039 653 2 500 31 909 577 2 173
25,45 15,92 16,03 3,96 4,28 4,31
10,10 11,31 11,95 3,34 3,48 4,26
29,99 10,08 11,82 3,00 3,00 3,00
0,06 1,00 0,99 0,00 1,00 0,00
61,24 47,97 69,92 21,00 15,00 21,00
33 048 653 2 504 33 048 653 2 504
922,16 1 070,87 999,37 11,38 3,88 3,72
680,19 902,73 1 144,36 5,84 2,36 2,23
784,65 799,70 700,00 12,00 3,00 3,00
0,25 5,00 1,53 1,00 1,00 1,00
7 089,87 4 716,07 9 689,34 42,00 12,00 13,00
33 048 653 2 504 33 048 653 2 504
108,21 305,83 321,35 0,03 0,07 0,02
200,64 356,82 532,64 0,30 0,48 0,21
31,00 188,98 94,01 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 2,84 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
5 000,00 2 354,79 6 534,27 7,00 4,00 4,00
33 048 653 2 504
0,15 0,38 0,40
0,23 0,35 0,39
0,04 0,22 0,21
0,00 0,00 0,00
1,00 1,00 1,00
33 048 653 2 504 33 048 653 2 504
27 852 248 1 172 31 894 577 2 164
0,84 0,38 0,47 0,97 0,88 0,86
33 048 653 2 504 33 048 653 2504
9 177 209 343 98 176 170
0,28 0,32 0,14 0,003 0,27 0,07
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
% of data available % of data available
Fixed Rate Currency Risk 
Nº of issues with data available
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
Nº of issues with data available
% of data available % of data available
Median
Maximum
Callable Rated 
Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with data available
Mean Mean
Univariate Analysis - dummy variables
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Minimum
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Tranche to transaction (%) 
Number of observations
Mean
Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Tranche size (USD million) Number of banks 
Number of observations Number of observations
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Transaction size (USD million) Number of tranches 
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Time to Maturity (years) Credit Rating 
Minimum Minimum
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median
ABS
Univariate Analysis - continuous variables
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Credit Spread (bps) Country Risk 
Variable of interest ABS Variable of interest 
Median
Table 5 - Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants of ABS, differentiated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe 
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US UK Continental Europe US UK
Continental 
Europe
12 191 3 457 3 645 12 910 3 418 3 631
32,14 50,11 -49,98 1,02 1,25 1,60
150,17 163,73 180,91 0,30 1,01 1,46
45,78 58,75 -58,20 1,00 1,00 1,00
-631,10 -434,48 -541,10 0,00 1,00 1,00
1 343,01 1 090,40 1 209,70 6,00 11,00 20,00
12 191 3 457 3 644 11 484 3 213 3 230
28,02 33,33 37,34 1,61 4,08 4,76
7,88 12,41 17,94 2,03 3,61 4,10
29,98 35,00 37,36 1,00 3,00 3,00
0,75 0,92 3,38 0,00 0,00 0,00
51,77 61,96 93,99 15,00 21,00 21,00
12 191 3 457 3 645 12 191 3 457 3 645
776,58 3 730,94 1 851,08 4,88 9,25 4,79
719,25 5 012,91 3 689,04 8,38 5,23 2,26
612,03 1 457,47 1 104,90 1,00 8,00 5,00
0,59 42,50 0,09 1,00 1,00 1,00
12 551,21 33 365,34 69 516,14 59,00 26,00 18,00
12 191 3 457 3 645 12 191 3 457 3 645
518,32 399,66 454,03 0,01 0,02 0,03
701,37 923,47 1 611,05 0,16 0,28 0,46
306,47 91,30 63,35 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
12 551,21 25 292,00 64 698,19 4,00 6,00 11,00
12 191 3 457 3 645
0,70 0,16 0,27
0,43 0,23 0,35
1,00 0,07 0,07
0,01 0,00 0,00
1,00 1,00 1,00
12 191 3 457 3 645 12 191 3 457 3 645
6 624 1 948 2 161 11 481 3 212 3 227
0,54 0,56 0,59 0,94 0,93 0,89
12 191 3 457 3 645 12 191 3 457 3645
8 594 96 161 44 1 346 55
0,70 0,03 0,04 0,004 0,39 0,02
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
% of data available % of data available
Fixed Rate Currency Risk 
Nº of issues with data available
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
Nº of issues with data available
% of data available % of data available
Median
Maximum
Callable Rated 
Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with data available
Mean Mean
Univariate Analysis - dummy variables
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Minimum
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Tranche to transaction (%) 
Number of observations
Mean
Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Tranche size (USD million) Number of banks 
Number of observations Number of observations
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Transaction size (USD million) Number of tranches 
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Time to Maturity (years) Credit Rating 
Minimum Minimum
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median
MBS
Univariate Analysis - continuous variables
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Credit Spread (bps) Country Risk 
Variable of interest 
MBS
Variable of interest 
Median
Table 6 -  Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants of MBS, differentiated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe 
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US UK Continental Europe US UK
Continental 
Europe
8 229 995 1 714 8 228 995 1 714
191,19 119,84 56,53 1,11 1,45 1,45
1 283,88 242,94 219,64 0,60 1,41 1,23
111,83 82,00 16,58 1,00 1,00 1,00
-643,90 -536,50 -485,10 0,00 0,00 0,00
63 744,22 2 004,50 966,40 6,00 10,00 9,00
8 229 995 1 714 7 762 885 1 502
23,28 18,48 19,85 5,23 5,24 5,04
13,51 17,13 19,48 3,98 4,27 4,07
12,23 13,54 13,17 4,00 3,00 3,00
0,03 2,00 1,94 0,00 0,00 0,00
91,00 99,00 93,03 15,00 15,00 20,00
8 229 995 1 714 8 229 995 1 714
571,82 661,12 616,58 7,40 6,72 6,43
413,18 1 367,17 790,13 2,52 2,49 2,79
461,09 451,44 437,50 7,00 7,00 6,00
3,00 2,64 3,50 1,00 1,00 1,00
3 984,00 20 001,70 6 609,60 22,00 17,00 16,00
8 229 995 1 714 8 229 995 1 714
82,83 137,36 125,45 0,00 0,00 0,01
160,46 782,17 344,07 0,05 0,00 0,24
30,00 30,53 32,20 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,20 0,31 0,00 0,00 0,00
2 835,00 16 601,70 5 992,47 3,00 0,00 7,00
8 229 995 1 714
0,16 0,20 0,22
0,23 0,26 0,28
0,06 0,07 0,08
0,00 0,00 0,00
1,00 1,00 1,00
8 229 995 1 714 8 229 995 1 714
1 568 520 693 7 734 883 1 501
0,19 0,52 0,40 0,94 0,89 0,88
8 229 995 1 714 8 229 995 1714
760 119 234 432 908 142
0,09 0,12 0,14 0,05 0,91 0,08
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
% of data available % of data available
Fixed Rate Currency Risk 
Nº of issues with data available
Nº of issues with dummy =1 Nº of issues with dummy =1
Nº of issues with data available
% of data available % of data available
Median
Maximum
Callable Rated 
Nº of issues with data available Nº of issues with data available
Mean Mean
Univariate Analysis - dummy variables
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Minimum
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Tranche to transaction (%) 
Number of observations
Mean
Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Tranche size (USD million) Number of banks 
Number of observations Number of observations
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Transaction size (USD million) Number of tranches 
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Median Median
Minimum Minimum
Maximum Maximum
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Maximum Maximum
Time to Maturity (years) Credit Rating 
Minimum Minimum
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Median
CDO
Univariate Analysis - continuous variables
Number of observations Number of observations
Mean Mean
Credit Spread (bps) Country Risk 
Variable of interest 
CDO
Variable of interest 
Median
Table 7 - Univariate statistics - Credit Spread determinants of CDO, differentiated by United States, United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe 
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In general, we can conclude that these geographic zones represent indeed 
distinct characteristics (Hypothesis 1) which may derive from, among others, 
markets of different sizes, macroeconomic issues, and political and legal 
variances. With this, it is important to note that the US contains a much more 
significant sample of 53,466 observations compared to 5,105 and 7,863 for the 
UK and CE, respectively. 
We can also, with this primary assessment, conclude that the average Credit 
Spread of bonds issued in the US is higher than the average Credit Spread of 
bonds issued in CE (Hypothesis 2) and that ABS, MBS and CDO exhibit 
different pricing characteristics, pointing out that they are different financial 
instruments in terms of spreads, pricing determinants and inherent 
characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
60 
 
6. Regression analysis 
To answer our main research question, we perform an OLS regression 
analysis Our initial model is the following: 
Credit Spreadi = α+ β1 USi + β2 Continental Europe i + β3 ABSi + β4 CDOi + β5 
Crisis Periodi + β6 Time to Maturityi + β7 Transaction Sizei + β8 Tranche to 
Transactioni + β9 Number of Banksi + β10 Callablei + β11 Ratedi + β12 Credit 
Ratingi + β13 Fixed Ratei + β14 Country Riski + β15 Currency Riski + β16 Risk 
Freei + β17 Volatilityi + β18 Euso5y-Libor3mi + β19 Subordinated Debti + β20 
GDP per capitai + β21 Common lawi + β22 Creditor Rightsi + εi 
6.1 Regression results 
6.1.1 How do common pricing characteristics compare between AS bonds in 
the United States vis-à-vis Continental Europe (CE)? 
The model [1a] in table 8, which represents our base model, estimates the 
impact of our base variables on determining the credit spread.  
The results suggest, for a level of significance of 1%, that Credit Spread of 
bonds issued in Continental Europe is lower than that for bonds issued in the 
United Kingdom and that bond spreads issued in UK and US do not differ 
significantly. We can also observe that ABS and CDO have higher Credit 
Spreads than MBS. 
The remaining outcomes that are statistically significant, such as Callable and 
Rated, are contrasting to what was predicted by previous investigations. In 
our model, the first variable positively affects the spreads and the second, 
negatively. Although both statistically significant at a level of 1%, in case 
where the bond issue is rated has much more substantial impact. 
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We also found that the sign and significance of the coefficients for the 
variable fixed rate, positive and significant, risk free ad creditors rights, both 
negative and significant, as well as for subordinated debt, positive and 
insignificant, and common law, negative and insignificant, are in line with 
the expected results based on the existing literature. 
To validate the coherence of these results and bearing in mind the impact of 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis on AS 
securities, in model [1b] we replaced dummies Continental Europe and US 
added per the interaction between these variables and a dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if the bond is issued during the pre-crisis period - from January 1, 
2000 through to September 14, 2008) and 0 if issued during the crisis period 
(September 15, 2008 through to December 31, 2016). 
Results on model [1b] show that the spreads of bonds issued in CE are 
effectually lower than those of bonds issued in the UK, and that bond 
spreads of bonds issued in the US do not differ significantly from bond 
spreads issued in the UK, proving that our previous results are robust over 
time. From this regression we can also perceive, in a preliminary way, that 
the crisis in continental Europe has increased AS bond spreads. 
Considering that spreads differ among security types and that ABS, MBS and 
CDO have different characteristics, in section 6.1.2 we perform analyses in 
isolation for each type of security.  
Considering the variables used as controls in all models, we can conclude 
that, in general, they affect credit spread with the same sign and impact 
expected based on the existing literature, apart from Currency Risk, Risk 
Free, Volatility, Subordinated Debt and Creditor Rights (see Table 8). 
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[1a] [1b]
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 355,19 *** 369,58 ***
(4,84) (5,10)
US -0,70
(-0,90)
Continental Europe -99,38 ***
(-8,82)
3,96
(0,60)
-17,99
(-0,98)
-116,68 ***
(-10,52)
-92,68 ***
(-6,69)
ABS 11,21 *** 8,33 ***
(3,51) (2,59)
CDO 77,42 *** 75,37 ***
(6,66) (6,19)
Crisis Period -32,15
(-1,25)
Time to maturity -29,74 *** -30,74 ***
(-17,13) (-18,12)
Transaction size -2,44 * -2,21
(-1,65) (-1,54)
Tranche to transaction 4,30 4,91
(0,98) (1,14)
Number of banks 5,16 4,63
(1,35) (1,19)
Callable 11,87 *** 10,51 ***
(4,75) (3,89)
Rated -460,50 *** -459,47 ***
(-8,41) (-8,36)
Credit Rating 24,45 *** 24,39 ***
(28,65) (28,50)
Fixed Rate 20,10 *** 20,99 ***
(3,38) (3,43)
Country Risk -6,23 *** -7,42 ***
(-3,75) (-4,85)
Currency Risk -58,97 *** -59,03 ***
(-6,71) (-6,66)
Risk Free -34,66 *** -35,60 ***
(-6,99) (-7,25)
Volatility -0,41 0,14
(0,88) (0,34)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,65 *** -0,63 ***
(-8,95) (-8,60)
Subordinated Debt 10,46 14,65 **
(1,60) (2,56)
GDP per capita 0,01 *** 0,01 ***
(9,28) (8,37)
Common Law -12,34 -14,68
(-1,02) (-1,20)
Creditor Rights -3,82 ** -6,98 ***
(-2,27) (-4,08)
yes yes
Number of observations 62 329 62 329
7,28 7,29
309,95 308,4
US crisis
US pre-crisis
Continental Europe crisis
Overall F-test
Adjusted R-squared
US, UK and Continental Europe US, UK and Continental EuropeCredit Spread (bps) 
Year Fixed Effects
Independent Variables:
Continental Europe pre-
crisis
Table 8 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads 
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6.1.2 Is the credit spread on AS bonds in the US higher than the credit 
spread on AS bonds in CE? 
Table 9 shows that bond credit spreads are higher in the US versus UK and 
CE, in both pre-crisis and crisis periods, and that ABS issued in the UK have 
higher spreads than those issued in CE. Again, these results remain over 
time. 
Regarding MBS, Table 10 shows that bond credit spreads are higher in the 
United States vis-à-vis CE in both pre-crisis and crisis periods and bond credit 
spreads do not differ significantly between MBS issued in the US versus UK. 
Finally, while bond credit spreads are higher for MBS issued in the UK 
versus CE in the pre-crisis period, during the crisis it can be observed a 
convergence process. 
Table 11 shows the results considering CDOs. We find that despite spreads 
do not differ significantly between CDOs issued in the US versus UK and UK 
and CE, CDOs’ spreads are higher for transactions closed in the US vis-à-vis 
CE. 
We can therefore conclude that the credit spreads of ABS, MBS and CDO 
issued in the US are higher than the credit spreads of the same securities 
issued in CE. 
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[4]
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 1 737,31 *** 649,64 *** 918,14 ***
(7,42) (3,77) (6,31)
US pre-crisis 184,97 ***
(5,42)
US  crisis 323,00 ***
(4,84)
UK  pre-crisis 53,12 *
(1,82)
UK crisis 56,64 *
(1,90)
Continental Europe  
pre-crisis -92,74 ***
(-4,01)
Continental Europe 
crisis -82,99 ***
(-3,28)
Time to maturity -15,36 *** -67,49 *** -21,65 ***
(-6,26) (-9,39) (-8,96)
Transaction size -5,89 *** -10,59 -7,58 ***
(-3,86) (-1,50) (-4,34)
Tranche to transaction -25,90 *** -8,21 -27,75 ***
(-4,99) (-0,34) (-4,21)
Number of banks 7,56 ** 18,69 9,26 **
(2,11) (1,21) (2,38)
Callable 0,08 -0,31 -1,20
(0,02) (-0,02) (-0,30)
Rated -657,72 *** -468,14 *** -566,31 ***
(-3,88) (-4,61) (-4,80)
Credit Rating 21,19 *** 19,79 *** 20,90 ***
(40,92) (10,39) (41,07)
Fixed Rate 21,22 *** 107,49 *** 19,18 ***
(6,29) (9,97) (5,66)
Country Risk -3,04 *** -6,91 *** -3,01 ***
(-3,15) (-3,07) (-2,75)
Currency Risk -48,99 *** -3,09 55,48 **
(-3,81) (-0,15) (2,45)
Risk Free -34,55 *** 21,48 -42,95 ***
(-9,10) (1,49) (-12,19)
Volatility 0,18 2,31 *** -0,26
(0,49) (2,80) (-0,73)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,53 *** -0,81 *** -0,64 ***
(-13,32) (-3,14) (-16,17)
Subordinated Debt 17,36 * -43,56 *** -0,62
(1,81) (-2,88) (-0,07)
GDP per capita -0,02 *** 0,00 *** 0,01 ***
(-5,28) (4,18) (6,19)
Common Law -7,36 -54,81 **
(-0,28) (-2,06)
Creditor Rights 28,50 ** -2,76 -10,29 ***
(2,26) (-0,41) (-3,77)
yes yes yes
Number of observations 32 194 2 743 33 783
24,65 17,93 22,59
194,95 56,65 196,38
Adjusted R-squared
Credit Spread (bps) 
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Overall F-test
UK versus CEUS versus UK CE versus US
[2] [3]
Table 9 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of 
ABS, differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and 
Continental Europe 
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Dependent Variable:
Intercept 400,88 *** 361,21 *** 68,15
(3,99) (4,59) (0,77)
US pre-crisis 28,14
(0,95)
US  crisis 80,73
(1,23)
UK  pre-crisis 136,39 ***
(12,08)
UK crisis 21,77
(1,30)
Continental Europe  
pre-crisis -79,93 ***
(-7,87)
Continental Europe 
crisis -25,79 *
(-1,76)
Time to maturity -41,12 *** -18,91 *** -47,47 ***
(-12,15) (-4,84) (-13,32)
Transaction size -2,72 -2,47 -1,27
(-1,63) (-0,96) (-0,72)
Tranche to transaction 0,88 -17,56 *** 11,31 **
(0,18) (-2,62) (2,38)
Number of banks -12,36 -8,75 -12,47
(-1,13) (-0,62) (-1,63)
Callable 16,03 *** 14,25 *** 17,71 ***
(5,20) (2,98) (5,38)
Rated -118,13 -388,10 *** -197,55 ***
(-1,16) (-16,02) (-2,89)
Credit Rating 15,90 *** 19,03 *** 14,92 ***
(20,67) (21,58) (19,97)
Fixed Rate 62,14 *** 60,58 *** 62,60 ***
(18,31) (2,71) (17,33)
Country Risk 2,03 -11,39 *** -4,54 *
(0,83) (-4,62) (-1,86)
Currency Risk -88,99 *** -87,06 *** 67,32 ***
(-12,85) (-11,41) (2,88)
Risk Free -8,06 * 17,47 * -12,62 ***
(-1,93) (1,88) (-3,42)
Volatility 0,45 1,68 *** 0,61 *
(1,10) (3,72) (1,81)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,43 *** -0,60 *** -0,56 ***
(-9,16) (-5,76) (1,81)
Subordinated Debt 50,92 *** -38,12 *** 49,03 ***
(9,95) (-6,33) (8,66)
GDP per capita 0,00 0,00 *** 0,00 ***
(-0,79) (5,42) (5,57)
Common Law 0,70 27,11 **
(0,01) (2,24)
Creditor Rights 17,65 -6,01 * 4,98 **
(1,59) (-1,86) (2,58)
yes yes yes
Number of observations 14 656 6 386 14 694
40,25 59,24 41,21
141,3 155,91 170,33
CE versus US
[7]
Independent Variables:
[5] [6]
Credit Spread (bps) US versus UK UK versus CE
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
Table 10 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of MBS, 
differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe 
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Dependent Variable:
Intercept 1 636,03 *** 784,11 *** 723,75 **
(5,69) (4,67) (2,43)
US pre-crisis 107,31
(1,56)
US  crisis 247,34
(1,36)
UK  pre-crisis -24,99
(-0,85)
UK crisis -10,64
(-0,35)
Continental Europe  pre-
crisis -198,08 ***
(-4,66)
Continental Europe 
crisis -202,05 *
(-1,72)
Time to maturity -26,54 *** -35,51 *** -32,03 ***
(-5,70) (-5,36) (-7,12)
Transaction size 0,12 -19,47 *** -2,30
(0,02) (-3,68) (-0,33)
Tranche to transaction -0,66 -31,34 ** -11,03
(-0,03) (-2,29) (-0,54)
Number of banks 75,58 * -7,22 0,14
(1,65) (-1,46) (0,01)
Callable -30,88 ** -13,51 -24,83 **
(-2,16) (-1,36) (-2,10)
Rated -408,98 *** -534,43 *** -395,53 ***
(-7,63) (-10,81) (-7,26)
Credit Rating 34,86 *** 33,88 *** 34,24 ***
(10,36) (32,12) (10,58)
Fixed Rate -20,56 60,68 *** 0,31
(-1,26) (5,28) (0,02)
Country Risk -12,10 -0,51 -17,17 **
(-1,21) (-0,10) (-2,55)
Currency Risk -116,42 *** 48,70 ** 70,90 ***
(-7,11) (2,51) (-4,08)
Risk Free -77,36 28,23 -96,62 **
(-1,59) (1,22) (-2,32)
Volatility -0,47 2,83 *** -0,51
(-0,14) (3,09) (-0,21)
Euso5y-Libor3m -1,18 * -0,60 ** -1,30 **
(-1,76) (-2,54) (-2,20)
Subordinated Debt 42,06 * -47,21 *** 31,39 *
(1,90) (-5,51) (1,71)
GDP per capita -0,02 0,00 0,00
(-1,54) (1,12) (0,66)
Common Law 10,60 1,13
(0,66) (0,04)
Creditor Rights -8,48 -2,88 -28,60 ***
(-0,27) (-0,45) (-5,30)
yes yes yes
Number of observations 8 646 2 340 9 216
3,04 64,9 3,29
83,77 88,44
CE versus US
[10]
Independent Variables:
[8] [9]
Credit Spread (bps) US versus UK UK versus CE
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
 
Table 11 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of CDO, differentiated 
by United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe 
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6.1.3 Are the credit spread and pricing processes of AS bonds significantly 
affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis? 
The impact of the crisis and its consequences were felt beyond the financial 
markets, reaching the global markets. In this way and in consideration of the 
studies analysed to carry out this work, we expect that, first, the crisis will 
significantly increase spreads and, secondly, that the ECB program, namely 
the ABSPP, will fulfil its objectives, reducing the AS bond credit spreads for 
transactions closed in the Euro Area. 
Analysing US transactions, Table 12 shows that, contrary to what we 
expected, the financial crisis decreased ABS spreads by 143,21bps and MBS 
spreads by 140,63 bps. However, the financial crisis does not impact CDO 
spreads in the US. 
In the UK, the results of sign and magnitude are the opposite of what was 
expected for ABS, negative and insignificant, and MBS, negative and 
significant. Table 13 shows that the financial crisis increased the credit spread 
for CDOs. 
Considering only the Euro Zone, the crisis period does not impact on credit 
spreads. 
In this way, we can conclude that these results are dissenting among 
typology and across geographic zone, being unclear and against the expected 
results, being as expected in the spreads of CDOs in the UK and in MBS in 
the Eurozone. 
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Dependent Variable:
Intercept 860,04 *** 229,53 *** -479,71
(4,45) (3,30) (-0,53)
Crisis period -143,21 *** -140,63 *** -84,37
(-11,36) (-19,35) (-0,72)
ABSPP -4,50 29,48 *** -166,32
(-0,64) (6,47) (-1,12)
Time to maturity -22,84 *** -50,17 *** -39,12 ***
(-8,21) (-13,68) (-6,54)
Transaction size -5,13 *** -9,66 *** 7,32
(-2,89) (-5,81) (0,89)
Tranche to transaction -18,87 *** 21,45 *** 33,54
(-3,71) (4,22) (1,45)
Number of banks 21,05 *** -4,45 108,91 **
(5,32) (-0,41) (2,17)
Callable -10,42 ** 5,10 -8,98
(-2,39) (1,54) (-0,82)
Rated -690,93 *** -3,99 -422,60 ***
(-3,82) (-1,17) (-8,06)
Credit Rating 20,75 *** 15,32 *** 35,31 ***
(37,29) (14,44) (8,21)
Fixed Rate 16,49 *** 60,15 *** -12,29
(4,45) (18,83) (-0,80)
Country Risk -6,10 *** -1,78 -18,17 *
(-5,28) (-0,85) (-1,69)
Currency Risk -66,29 *** -21,42 -131,52 ***
(-2,69) (-0,51) (-6,52)
Risk Free -14,12 *** 7,47 *** -17,57
(-5,74) (3,30) (-0,46)
Volatility 2,93 *** 3,50 *** 5,25
(6,35) (12,95) (1,42)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,32 *** -0,20 *** -0,47
(-7,89) (-6,17) (-0,67)
Subordinated Debt 56,12 *** 106,16 *** 91,35 ***
(7,77) (18,36) (4,69)
GDP per capita 0,00 * 0,00 *** 0,02
(1,72) (3,43) (1,52)
Creditor Rights -6,92 *** -13,57 *** 30,04
(-3,44) (-5,81) (1,45)
no no no
Number of observations 31 617 11 482 7 761
20,17 35,15 2,44
189,89 213,6 130,63
CDO
[14] [15]
Credit Spread (bps) ABS MBS
[16]
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
Table 12 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, MBS and CDO in 
United States with crisis and ABSPP 
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Table 13 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, MBS and CDO in United 
Kingdom with crisis and ABSPP 
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 306,38 327,63 *** -117,03
(1,20) (3,20) (-0,26)
Crisis period -31,06 -58,28 ** 95,50 *
(-1,01) (-2,50) (1,70)
ABSPP 56,45 * 13,76 86,06 **
(1,84) (0,48) (2,01)
Time to maturity -27,94 ** -3,18 -14,67
(-2,48) (-0,60) (-1,12)
Transaction size -10,48 * -3,51 -17,19 *
(-1,78) (-1,07) (-1,73)
Tranche to transaction 32,37 * -31,41 *** -39,13
(1,73) (-2,68) (-1,47)
Number of banks 21,94 *** 53,10 ***
(2,71) (7,84)
Callable 19,23 * 8,97 -51,42 ***
(1,74) (1,42) (-2,71)
Rated -379,79 *** -588,23 ***
(-26,64) (-6,00)
Credit Rating 25,98 *** 22,15 *** 33,22 ***
(11,19) (19,47) (22,95)
Fixed Rate 69,89 *** 66,12 *** -15,82
(5,04) (4,16) (-0,77)
Country Risk 1,67 1,70 9,23
(0,46) (0,48) (0,93)
Currency Risk -48,55 *** -106,05 *** -48,98 **
(-3,53) (-16,78) (-2,30)
Risk Free 14,21 32,99 *** 18,38
(1,41) (6,80) (1,10)
Volatility 0,76 0,35 6,25 ***
(0,69) (0,48) (4,75)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,42 ** -0,67 *** -0,83 ***
(-2,58) (-5,74) (-2,82)
Subordinated Debt -58,84 *** -60,60 *** -50,81 ***
(-3,68) (-9,74) (-3,16)
GDP per capita 0,00 0,00 ** 0,01 ***
(-0,11) (1,92) (3,12)
Creditor Rights -16,92 4,33 130,86 **
(-0,63) (0,27) (-0,26)
no no no
Number of observations 577 3 174 885
54,76 59,95 59,15
22,35 54,23
[17] [18] [19]
Credit Spread (bps) ABS MBS CDO
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
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Table 14 -Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, MBS and CDO in Euro zone 
with crisis and ABSPP 
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 460,49 *** 91,91 918,43 ***
(2,77) (1,01) (8,28)
Crisis period -14,81 32,36 -23,03
(-0,32) (1,56) (-0,52)
ABSPP 64,20 *** 136,31 *** 137,12 ***
(2,84) (4,05) (4,31)
Time to maturity -73,30 *** -30,35 *** -45,63 ***
(-9,37) (-4,75) (-6,05)
Transaction size -8,44 5,30 -24,24 ***
(-1,18) (1,48) (-5,28)
Tranche to transaction -18,49 -18,92 ** -36,01 **
(-0,61) (-2,02) (-2,17)
Number of banks -10,07 * -2,11 0,18
(-1,83) (-0,28) (0,22)
Callable 0,84 16,34 ** 2,30
(0,07) (2,33) (0,05)
Rated -466,15 *** -365,27 *** -422,66 ***
(-4,41) (-9,55) (-23,59)
Credit Rating 18,48 *** 17,45 *** 33,96 ***
(9,12) (15,16) (23,54)
Fixed Rate 72,59 *** 17,90 81,20 ***
(4,15) (0,50) (6,00)
Country Risk -6,68 * -27,95 *** -9,38 **
(-2,01) (-6,28) (-2,17)
Currency Risk 58,27 * 114,18 *** 111,51 ***
(1,67) (4,60) (6,90)
Risk Free 37,67 *** 36,18 *** 5,37
(4,01) (6,22) (0,49)
Volatility 3,79 *** 2,48 *** 3,14 ***
(4,45) (4,75) (3,34)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,77 *** -0,95 *** -1,04 ***
(-8,45) (-10,08) (-4,97)
Subordinated Debt -50,34 ** -34,02 *** -47,88 ***
(-2,56) (-3,69) (-4,18)
GDP per capita 0,01 *** 0,00 *** 0,00
(6,89) (6,79) (1,21)
Common Law -36,21 2,55 20,87
(-1,19) (0,24) (1,21)
Creditor Rights 0,71 -12,63 *** -8,13 ***
(0,10) (-3,64) (-1,31)
no no no
Number of observations 2 166 3 212 1 455
15,35 53,77 67,32
59,75 107,82
[20] [21] [22]
Credit Spread (bps) ABS MBS CDO
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
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6.1.4 What was the impact of the Central Banks’ Quantitative Easing 
programmes on AS bond credit spreads? 
The agreement with the objectives of the European Central Bank, as the 
regulatory bank, its asset purchase programmes should have an impact on 
the market lowering the sovereign bond spreads.  
In fact, according to previously noted authors30, the ABSPP period (from 
September 4, 2014 to December 31, 2016) improved and attenuated credit 
spreads. 
Considering the United States in table 12, the ECB’ program achieved the 
expected results in ABS and CDO, but not significant. In the case of MBS, the 
ABSPP increased the spreads. 
On the other hand, in the UK represented on table 13, this program increased 
the spreads for all typologies. 
Finally, the Euro Zone in table 14, has the same interpretation as the UK: the 
program was not effective in any typology. 
Finally, we conclude that ABSPP have the desired impact for the spreads of 
ABS and CDOs issued in the United States. 
6.2 Robustness checks 
6.2.1 Floating or fixed rate 
To validate the previous results, we then present robustness results tests. 
Firstly, we divide the model by typology, broken down by type of rate: 
floating or fixed priced.  
Model [11] in table 15, shows that, for floating rate, US spreads are higher 
than in the UK for pre-crisis period, not being robust when comparing the 
                                                 
30 Watfe (2015) and Claessens et al. (2010)  
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crisis period. Also, the results of CE are robust over time, being the spreads 
in CE lower than in the UK over the both periods. In fixed priced securities, 
the spreads do not diverge over time. 
Considering MBS, on model [12], the results for CE are, again, robust over 
period of pre-crisis and during crisis, for floating and fixed rate. The spreads 
of bonds from the US are not robust, evidencing discrepancies in the floating 
type of rate, during crisis. The remaining values are not statistically 
significant. 
Model [13] shows the results for CDOs and, in terms of fixed good prices, the 
results do not diverge and are not statistically significant. In terms of floating 
rate, the results are robust over time, presenting no discrepancies across 
outcomes from the first estimated model. 
In this robustness test, the results based on fixed rate are not significant, as 
showed on table 15. ABS and MBS only show divergence in the US during 
crisis, with the remaining results robust over time. 
6.2.2 Issuer Parent 
Subsequently, we introduced the financial characteristics of the issuer parent, 
the originator, in our baseline models. We introduce Total Assets (in the 
sense that the financial products have as collateral these assets), net loans 
over total assets ratio and loan to deposit ratio (as liquidity measure), cost in 
relation to its income, equity to total assets ratio and, finally, liquid assets to 
deposits. 
Adding the characteristics of the banks in the models (table 16, 17 and 18), 
we can conclude that, for ABS, the results are robust. The only discrepancy 
observed is in the UK versus CE column, not being statistically significant 
and, therefore, concluding that they do not differ. The same results occur in 
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the CDO typology. As for MBS, the basis is identical, but the discrepancy is 
observed when comparing US versus UK. 
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Table 15 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of ABS, MBS and CDO 
by Type of Rate 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 575,81 *** 825,65 *** 781,06 *** 913,05 *** 739,56 *** 911,65 ***
(3,59) (3,99) (12,74) (3,48) (2,88) (2,92)
US pre-crisis 70,63 *** -18,96 -1,20 20,95 53,73 ** 38,20
(4,17) (-1,16) (-0,16) (0,32) (2,25) (1,00)
US crisis -71,57 *** 46,27 -98,84 *** -82,40 66,79 97,79
(-3,09) (0,96) (-6,94) (-0,94) (0,57) (1,34)
-39,72 ** -62,97 -105,48 *** -329,09 *** -150,05 *** -39,77
(-1,67) (-0,85) (-10,04) (-3,68) (-4,27) (-0,78)
-89,41 *** -83,01 -28,23 * -172,13 *** -163,49 *** 84,85
(-3,53) (-0,91) (-1,73) (-2,81) (3,86) (1,59)
Time to maturity -66,93 *** 15,60 *** -40,96 *** -37,00 *** -24,86 *** -63,00 ***
(-20,02) (6,66) (-9,09) (-9,18) (-5,36) (-5,45)
Transaction size -4,65 ** -14,83 *** -4,36 ** -4,77 ** -5,17 -17,86
(-2,19) (-6,45) (-2,20) (-2,18) (-0,84) (-1,56)
Tranche to transaction -8,61 -39,68 *** -14,46 ** 14,99 ** -6,53 -69,21
(-0,99) (-6,05) (-2,38) (2,22) (-0,31) (-1,50)
Number of banks -3,00 3,34 -21,07 * -17,47 -3,92 15,07
(-0,29) (1,11) (-1,79) (-1,46) (-0,32) (0,48)
Callable -3,73 4,02 11,90 *** 21,66 *** -26,49 ** -18,44
(-0,76) (0,79) (3,14) (5,45) (-2,17) (-1,14)
Rated -593,32 *** -446,51 *** -367,59 *** 4,89 -442,89 *** -150,11 ***
(-4,63) (-2,73) (-11,28) (0,31) (-8,04) (-8,12)
Credit Rating 21,88 *** 17,57 *** 18,23 *** 15,37 *** 34,27 *** 32,35 ***
(36,18) (22,60) (24,34) (11,82) (11,43) (11,70)
Country Risk -5,52 *** -2,83 *** -8,12 *** -5,23 -11,79 * -6,22 *
(-3,35) (-2,66) (-4,08) (-0,69) (-1,70) (-1,66)
Currency Risk -34,35 45,02 ** -75,37 *** -71,36 * -78,22 *** -16,41
(-1,63) (2,24) (-10,24) (-1,68) (-5,02) (-0,59)
Risk Free -54,52 *** 1,41 -30,60 *** -5,24 -90,24 ** -16,28
(-14,05) (0,24) (-8,32) (-1,01) (-2,02) (-0,80)
Volatility 0,62 0,32 -0,73 * 1,21 *** -0,29 1,30
(1,55) (0,63) (-1,88) (3,17) (-0,11) (0,66)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,78 *** -0,17 *** -0,61 *** -0,32 *** -0,27 * -0,42
(-17,78) (-2,62) (-10,98) (-6,70) (-1,89) (-1,55)
Subordinated Debt -2,17 -2,75 -20,99 *** 89,56 *** 22,31 22,04
(-0,22) (-0,40) (-4,17) (12,95) (1,19) (1,09)
GDP per capita 0,01 *** 0,00 0,00 *** -0,01 0,00 0,00
(5,32) (0,42) (5,59) (-1,15) (0,42) (-0,75)
Common Law -10,65 -61,94 22,37 * 25,05 2,79 1,84
(-0,44) (-0,81) (1,85) (0,38) (0,11) (0,07)
Creditor Rights -8,29 *** 3,61 -1,23 -54,76 -26,00 *** -13,85
(-2,67) (0,44) (-0,56) (-2,34) (-4,98) (-1,22)
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 25 562 8 798 9 575 8 293 9 140 961
24,08 39,26 62,24 26,64 3,39 45,44
273,62 57,12 243,54 50,47 95,72
[11]
ABS
Credit Spread (bps) Floating Floating
[12]
MBS
FixedFixed
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
Continental Europe 
pre-crisis
Continental Europe 
crisis
[13]
CDO
Floating Fixed
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[4b]
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 1 580,75 *** 287,71 287,08 *
(9,95) (1,58) (1,77)
US before crisis 239,06 ***
(4,75)
US during crisis 283,66 ***
(3,15)
UK before crisis -49,75
(-0,96)
UK during crisis -1,56
(-0,03)
Continental Europe before 
crisis -81,64 **
(-2,03)
Continental Europe during 
crisis -99,91 ***
(-2,85)
Time to maturity -13,66 ** -85,42 *** -23,54 ***
(-2,46) (-9,28) (-4,50)
Transaction size -4,08 * -11,36 -5,34 **
(-1,69) (-1,59) (-2,32)
Tranche to transaction -19,29 * -52,19 *** -29,62 ***
(-1,82) (-3,00) (-2,70)
Number of banks -5,08 -3,67
(-0,60) (-0,40)
Callable 2,90 15,65 4,08
(0,50) (1,43) (0,74)
Rated -896,16 *** -412,59 *** -470,63 ***
(-65,99) (-3,98) (-3,61)
Credit Rating 19,26 *** 14,86 *** 18,58 ***
(20,03) (8,15) (20,88)
Fixed Rate 6,89 84,53 *** 5,99
(1,24) (4,16) (1,08)
Country Risk -2,35 0,57 0,22
(-1,47) (0,28) (0,13)
Currency Risk -4,26 6,73 50,79 **
(-0,24) (0,41) (2,03)
Risk Free -41,72 *** 29,39 -51,82 ***
(-6,45) (1,43) (-8,87)
Volatility 0,55 2,31 ** -0,26
(0,85) (2,60) (-0,45)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,59 *** -0,59 *** -0,70 ***
(-8,52) (3,09) (-10,07)
Subordinated Debt 29,30 -45,35 ** 15,08
(1,56) (-2,52) (0,94)
GDP per capita -0,16 *** 0,00 ** 0,01 ***
(-2,81) (2,59) (4,63)
Common Law 19,38 -36,76
(0,44) (-1,00)
Creditor Rights 25,43 4,43 -9,76 **
(1,37) (0,62) (-2,01)
Total  Assets -0,34 7,22 ** 5,32 **
(-0,14) (2,31) (2,05)
Net loans / Total Assets 0,20 1,07 ** 0,89
(0,83) (2,02) (0,41)
Loans / Deposits 1,27 -26,42 *** 1,70
(0,38) (-2,92) (0,58)
Cost to Income -0,06 1,52 *** 0,48 ***
(-0,34) (4,14) (2,96)
Equity / Total Assets -1,56 7,30 *** 0,29
(-0,56) (2,68) (0,12)
Liquid Assets / Deposits -0,12 0,82 ** -0,12
(-0,99) (2,55) (-1,10)
yes yes yes
Number of observations 12 996 1 158 13 668
13,21 62,43 15,59
52,05 107,73
US versus CE | Issuer 
Parent
[2b] [3b]
Credit Spread (bps) 
US versus UK | 
Issuer Parent
UK versus CE | Issuer 
Parent
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
Table 16 -  Regression analyses of the determinants of credit 
spreads of ABS with Issuer Parent Characteristics, differentiated by 
United States, United Kingdom and Continental Europe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
[7b]
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 184,32 208,92 529,29 ***
(1,23) (1,56) (3,20)
US before crisis -36,44
(-0,74)
US during crisis 42,84
(0,41)
UK before crisis 132,81 ***
(5,24)
Uk during crisis 49,42 **
(1,99)
Continental Europe 
before crisis -82,53 ***
(-3,85)
Continental Europe 
during crisis -76,14 ***
(-2,88)
Time to maturity -34,75 *** -1,34 -43,97 ***
(-6,69) (-0,23) (-8,42)
Transaction size -10,74 *** -10,95 *** -3,69
(-3,27) (-2,89) (-1,05)
Tranche to transaction 58,90 *** -29,25 ** 55,84 ***
(5,68) (-2,36) (5,99)
Number of banks -36,59 -24,47 -35,09
(-0,77) (-1,52) (-1,59)
Callable 14,78 ** 18,59 ** 24,48 ***
(2,02) (2,27) (3,01)
Rated -72,04 *** -399,47 *** -331,28 ***
(-5,34) (-21,64) (-3,07)
Credit Rating 19,33 *** 18,35 *** 17,19 ***
(15,24) (12,84) (13,84)
Fixed Rate 27,49 *** 81,66 * 27,62 ***
(4,20) (1,72) (3,80)
Country Risk 0,67 -8,30 ** -11,76 **
(0,19) (-2,51) (-2,10)
Currency Risk -53,83 *** -61,42 *** 53,64
(-4,69) (-4,83) (1,30)
Risk Free -10,93 30,94 ** -15,96 **
(-1,33) (2,07) (-2,14)
Volatility -1,41 * 2,31 *** -0,26
(-1,77) (3,29) (-0,45)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,55 *** -0,65 *** -0,54 ***
(-6,57) (-4,24) (-6,13)
Subordinated Debt 36,01 *** -39,31 *** 37,68 ***
(4,71) (-3,84) (4,61)
GDP per capita 0,01 0,00 *** 0,00 ***
(0,84) (3,83) (3,42)
Common Law -13,10 -10,79
(0,49) (-0,42)
Creditor Rights 3,69 -19,17 *** -11,07 **
(0,19) (-3,49) (-2,45)
Total  Assets 8,59 * 7,04 ** 0,68
(1,95) (2,56) (0,23)
Net loans / Total Assets 0,48 0,22 1,05 ***
(0,09) (0,46) (2,86)
Loans / Deposits 19,84 -1,52 -20,40 *
(0,66) (-0,10) (-1,68)
Cost to Income 0,01 0,55 * 0,97 ***
(0,04) (1,79) (3,38)
Equity / Total Assets 0,60 0,20 0,55
(0,68) (0,26) (0,36)
Liquid Assets / Deposits -0,03 -0,07 -0,11
(-0,26) (-0,27) (-1,11)
yes yes yes
Number of observations 4 579 2 603 4 524
44,30 56,07 42,84
58,92
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
US versus CE | Issuer 
Parent
[5b] [6b]
Credit Spread (bps) 
US versus UK | 
Issuer Parent
UK versus CE | Issuer 
Parent
Table 17 -  Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of MBS with Issuer 
Parent Characteristics, differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental 
Europe 
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[10b]
Dependent Variable:
Intercept 687,12 1 279,10 *** 769,03 **
(1,14) (3,17) (2,36)
US before crisis 290,47 *
(1,89)
US during crisis 269,48
(0,75)
UK before crisis -8,90
(-0,14)
Uk during crisis 76,61
(1,23)
Continental Europe before 
crisis -160,18 **
(-2,48)
Continental Europe during 
crisis -19,54
(-0,34)
Time to maturity -26,75 -69,17 *** -40,16 **
(-1,31) (-3,33) (-2,52)
Transaction size 11,31 -18,87 14,69
(0,97) (-1,35) (1,45)
Tranche to transaction -9,01 12,83 -18,20
(-0,27) (0,49) (-0,60)
Number of banks 63,40 50,41
(1,30) (0,67)
Callable -68,69 *** -42,38 * -38,02 **
(-4,33) (-1,86) (-2,06)
Rated -482,10 *** -594,01 *** -410,09 ***
(-5,91) (-10,17) (-4,89)
Credit Rating 34,09 *** 30,97 *** 32,60 ***
(16,16) (12,73) (15,64)
Fixed Rate -6,58 63,42 *** 42,20 *
(-0,19) (2,72) (1,86)
Country Risk -9,20 -17,45 *** -11,35 *
(-1,43) (-3,23) (-1,99)
Currency Risk -34,04 7,03 -18,01
(-1,12) (0,18) (-0,57)
Risk Free -19,79 24,42 -74,71 ***
(-0,58) (0,53) (-2,89)
Volatility 1,85 1,62 -1,31
(0,97) (1,19) (-0,67)
Euso5y-Libor3m -0,68 * -0,92 * -1,06 ***
(-1,76) (-1,75) (-2,89)
Subordinated Debt -4,81 -26,85 -13,21
(-0,29) (-1,62) (-0,80)
GDP per capita -0,01 0,00 0,01 *
(-0,60) (0,95) (1,74)
Common Law -32,65 -27,19
(-0,66) (-0,46)
Creditor Rights 68,26 0,25 -19,40 *
(102) (0,01) (-1,69)
Total  Assets -6,99 -3,26 -6,39
(-0,90) (-0,61) (-1,04)
Net loans / Total Assets 0,67 -1,55 ** 0,25
(1,08) (-2,47) (0,44)
Loans / Deposits -23,61 16,10 -6,81
(-1,56) (1,25) (-0,49)
Cost to Income 0,34 -2,14 *** 0,64
(0,44) (-3,67) (0,99)
Equity / Total Assets -0,52 -3,75 *** 0,24
(-0,46) (-3,87) (0,19)
Liquid Assets / Deposits 0,23 -1,07 *** 0,11
(0,81) (-3,00) (0,44)
yes yes yes
Number of observations 861 476 927
60,17 69,89 59,79
US versus CE | Issuer Parent
[8b] [9b]
Credit Spread (bps) 
US versus UK | Issuer 
Parent UK versus CE | Issuer Parent
Independent Variables:
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted R-squared
Overall F-test
Table 18 - Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads of CDO with Issuer 
Parent Characteristics, differentiated by United States, United Kingdom and Continental 
Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
7. Conclusions 
This dissertation studies asset securitization, analysing its general 
characteristics, main advantages and disadvantages and compare spreads 
and pricing characteristics of ABS, MBS and CDOs among bonds issued in 
the US versus UK versus Continental Europe. We conclude that it is a complex 
process that allows originators to transfer risks to market participants, 
increase liquidity and reduce funding costs, when compared with traditional 
debt instruments. Nevertheless, the unaccountable use of this financial 
product increases misperceptions of risk and asset valuation, contributing to 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
To analyse how credit spreads and pricing factors compare between 
securitization products and among markets, we use a dataset of transactions 
closed in the US, UK and Continental Europe in the 2000-2016 period. 
Our results are in congruence with the fact that the spreads are different, 
reaching higher values in the United States, followed by United Kingdom 
and, finally, Continental Europe (except for CDOs, where bonds issued in 
Continental Europe present higher credit spreads than those closed in the 
UK).  
However, our results differ from the impact of the crisis and ABSPP. The 
crisis only increased the spreads, as expected, of CDOs in the UK and in MBS 
in the Eurozone. ABSPP have the desired impact only for the spreads of ABS 
and CDOs issued in the United States. 
This dissertation contributes to the non-existent literature regarding the 
securitization process in Europe. It also concludes that spreads are effectively 
different, being larger in the United States. Since our objective was only to 
determine if spreads are distinct across regions, it would be important to 
realize where these differences come from. 
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Thus, it would be important for field, a more detailed investigation of the 
whole history of the European securitization process, and the main 
differences between these economic zones. Prospecting the impact of 
government guarantees on the European process and how it could be 
beneficial, or not, for this market area. 
We also concluded that the crisis had a significant impact on the drastic 
increase in spreads and that ABSPP had the desired impact, nevertheless, in 
any case, separately: for CDOs in the United States and MBS in the UK and 
Eurozone. 
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